Appeal from Ingham, James T. Kallman, J.
Allen, P. J., and Bronson and Maher, JJ.
1. Pleading -- Amendments -- Court Rules -- Response -- Multiple Defendants.
The right to amend pleadings without leave of court or consent of the adverse party terminates by court rule 15 days after a responsive pleading is served by a defendant; where there are two defendants and where the responsive pleading so filed by one defendant responds to the charges initially made against both defendants, the right of the plaintiff to amend his pleadings as to both defendants is subject to the 15-day limitation (GCR 1963, 118.1).
2. Limitation of Actions -- Statutes -- Contracts -- Torts -- Wrongful Discharge -- Fair Representation -- Separate Actions -- Same Limitation.
Two separate wrongful acts are involved in a suit against both an employer for wrongful discharge of an employee and against the union and company collectively for violation of the federally recognized obligation of fair representation of a meritorious grievance; the applicable period of limitations for each of these two wrongs may be different, when determined by applying the statute of limitations which most closely comports to the nature of the action, but they are so intimately related as to require that the same period of limitation be applied to both.
3. Limitation of Actions -- Torts -- Injury to Person -- Other Injuries -- Contractual Relationships.
Claims sounding in tort are governed either by a three-year period of limitations as an injury to person or property, or by a six-year period for all other personal actions, but they are not governed by the six-year limitation provided for breach of contract actions even where the underlying relationship between the parties is contractual (MCLA 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805, MCLA 600.5807; MSA 27A.5807, MCLA 600.5813; MSA 27A.5813).
4. Limitation of Actions -- Termination of Employment -- Tort Injuries -- Fair Representation -- Related Claims -- Same Limitation.
A suit against an employer for wrongful termination of an employment contract is based upon wrongful interference with earning capacity and presents a claim for injuries to person and property which is subject to the three-year statute of limitations for such actions; an included claim against the employer and the labor union for breach of the duty of fair representation is so intimately related as to require the same period of limitation to apply (MCLA 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805).
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Allen
Complaint by Lois R. Glowacki against Motor Wheel Corporation and Allied Industrial Workers of America, Local No. 182 seeking damages for wrongful discharge from employment and breach of duty of fair representation. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.
What statute of limitations governs an action brought by an employee against the employer for wrongful discharge and against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation? May a bill of complaint be amended under GCR 1963, 118.1 without leave of court or consent of the adverse party where no responsive pleading has been filed by one defendant but where the second defendant has filed a responsive pleading responding to the charges made against both defendants? These questions, each of first impression, were adversely decided to plaintiff upon the trial court's granting of a motion for accelerated judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals as of right. We affirm.
Plaintiff was a full time employee of Motor Wheel where she worked in a job classified as a band line production worker. On April 20, 1969, she was placed on sick leave and on March 17, 1970, was notified of the termination of her employment. On June 13, 1974, approximately four years and three months after her employment termination, she filed her first bill of complaint. The complaint alleged (a) that plaintiff was "wrongfully and without good cause discharged from her job as a production worker" by Motor Wheel, said discharge being "the result of discriminatory practices on the part of the employer resulting in failure to notify plaintiff of sick leave expiration", and (b) that the discharge "was a result of a conspiracy between the employer and the union by and through which the union acted arbitrarily, capriciously and without just and reasonable cause and with malice by refusing to process ...