The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. Robert Holmes Bell
OPINION ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge, who issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), recommending that this Court deny the petition (docket #7). The matter presently is before the Court on Petitioner's objections to the R&R (docket #8). For the reasons that follow, Petitioner's objections are rejected and the R&R is adopted, as clarified by the instant Opinion.
This Court reviews de novo those portions of an R&R to which specific objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). See also U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1088 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that a district court conducts de novo review of magistrate judge's rulings on dispositive motions); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[A] general objection to a magistrate's report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not satisfy the requirement that an objection be filed. The objections must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious."). The Court may accept, reject or modify any or all of the Magistrate Judge's findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Petitioner was convicted of murder by a Genessee County jury and was sentenced to life imprisonment on October 27, 1993. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the petition be dismissed because it was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner has filed lengthy objections to the R&R. While he does not dispute that his petition is untimely, he contends that he should be entitled to equitable tolling because he has raised a claim of actual innocence.
Petitioner's application is barred by the one-year statute of limitations provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), which became effective on April 24, 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-132, 110 STAT. 1214 ("AEDPA"). Section 2244(d)(1) provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest ofS
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The running of the statute of limitations is tolled when "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001) (limiting the tolling provision to only State, and not Federal, processes); Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (defining "properly filed").
The Magistrate Judge concluded that § 2244(d)(1)(A) provides the period of limitation in this case and that the other subsections do not apply to the grounds that Petitioner has raised. Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year limitation period runs from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court denied his application on February 3, 1997. Petitioner did not petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The one-year limitations period, however, did not begin to run until the ninety-day period in which Petitioner could have sought review in the United States Supreme Court had expired. The ninety-day period expired on Monday, May 5, 1997. The statute of limitations began running that date and expired on May 5, 1998. The petition was not filed until 2008, ten years after the statute of limitations expired. The Magistrate Judge concluded, therefore, that, absent equitable tolling, the petition was time-barred. The Magistrate Judge also concluded that equitable tolling was unwarranted on the facts of the case.
Petitioner objects to the R&R, contending that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he has raised a credible claim of actual innocence. He also vaguely suggests that the statute of limitations should be calculated under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D), from the date on which "the factual predicate of the claim or ...