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Jones v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

March 18, 2015

Janet Jones, Plaintiff,
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Defendant.


DENISE PAGE HOOD, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court (removed from Macomb County Circuit Court) on Defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 4, filed November 25, 2013] to which Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition, [Docket No. 7, filed December 10, 2013] and Defendant filed a reply [Docket No. 10, filed December 27, 2013]. Also before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction [Docket No. 6, filed December 4, 2013] to which Defendant filed a response [Docket No. 9, filed December 23, 2013]. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is DENIED.


On or about May 2, 2007, Plaintiff Janet Jones executed a mortgage and note as security for a $206, 000.00 loan from Washington Mutual Bank, FA ("Washington Mutual"), to finance the purchase of real property located at 30841 Ohmer Drive, Warren Michigan 48092 (the "Property"). On July 29, 2012, Washington Mutual assigned the mortgage on the property to JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA ("JP Morgan Chase"). Both the mortgage and assignment were recorded in the Macomb County Register of Deeds.

Following this assignment, Plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage payments, leading to foreclosure of the property. Foreclosure proceeded by publication and notice of the sale was posted on August 8, 15, 22, and 29, 2012. The property was sold at a Sheriff's Sale on September 7, 2012 to Freddie Mac. The Sheriff's Deed noted that the last day to redeem the property was March 7, 2013, consistent with the sixth month statutory redemption period. Plaintiff failed to redeem the property by March 7, 2013.

Though Plaintiff failed to redeem the property, she remained on the premises. Freddie Mac commenced eviction proceedings against Plaintiff in the State of Michigan 37th District Court, Case No. 136843-LT, before the Honorable Matthew Sabaugh. On or about July 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a counterclaim against Defendant alleging: Fraudulent Misrepresentations (Count I); Breach of Contract (Count II); Violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et. seq. (Count III); and Violation of M.C.L. § 600.3204, et. seq. (Count IV).

On August 27, 2013, the 37th District Court entered an order, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, removing the counterclaim/Plaintiff's Verified Counter Complaint (the "complaint") to Macomb County Circuit Court. The case was docketed on or about October 18, 2013, as Janet Jones v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Case No. 2013-004205-CH, before the Honorable John Foster. Following removal to Macomb County Circuit Court, Defendant Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") removed the complaint to this Court.


Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court explained that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.] Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level..." Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Although not outright overruling the "notice pleading" requirement under Rule 8(a)(2) entirely, Twombly concluded that the "no set of facts" standard "is best forgotten as an incomplete negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard." Id. at 563.

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement, " but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. at 557. Such allegations are not to be discounted because they are "unrealistic or nonsensical, " but rather because they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion - even if that conclusion is cast in the form of a factual allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).

In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory "factual content" and the reasonable inferences from that content must be "plausibly suggestive" of a claim entitling a plaintiff to relief. Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n]' - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

The Court notes that consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is confined to the pleadings. Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2008). In assessing the facial sufficiency of the complaint, the Court must ordinarily do so without resorting to matters outside the pleadings. Wysocki v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir.2010). However, "documents attached to the pleadings become part of the pleadings and may be considered on a motion to dismiss." Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c)); see also Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 463 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010).

The Court further notes that even if a document is not attached to a complaint or answer, "when a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment." Commercial Money Ctr., 508 F.3d at 335-36. Where a plaintiff does not refer directly to given documents in the pleadings, if those documents govern the plaintiff's rights and are necessarily incorporated by reference, then the motion need not be converted to one for summary judgment. See Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that plan documents could be incorporated and assessed without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, even though the complaint referred only to the "plan" and not the accompanying documents). Additionally, "[a] court may consider matters of ...

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