United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, District Judge.
Darrin LaPine ("Plaintiff') filed a pro se Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees or Costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). See Dkt. Nos. 1, 2. The Court denied Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of the Filing Fee and dismissed the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), because Plaintiff already had "three strikes." See Dkt. No. 6. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Relief from Judgment  in which Plaintiff asserts that § 1915(g) does not apply to his case because he is a parolee and not a "prisoner" as defined by § 1915(h).
Plaintiff brings the present Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that he is entitled to relief from this Court's judgment. See Dkt. No. 8. Rule 60(b) allows a party relief from judgment, order, or other proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence, that, with reasonable diligence, could have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321(1996), a prisoner is generally prevented from proceeding in forma pauperis in a civil action if, on three or more prior occasions, the prisoner has brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The PLRA defines the term "prisoner" as follows:
As used in this section, the term "prisoner" means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pre-trial release, or diversionary program.
42 U.S.C. § 1915(h) (emphasis added). A plaintiff's status as a "prisoner" under this section turns on whether the inmate was confined when suit was filed. See Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 669 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
Here, even though the Michigan Department of Corrections granted Plaintiff parole and lists him as a parolee, Plaintiff is still a "person incarcerated or detained in any facility." The Complaint alleges that on February 10, 2015, Plaintiff was issued a parole order and was transferred to the Detroit Reentry Center ("DRC"), formerly known as the Ryan Correctional Facility, to take part in a violence prevention program. See Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that he transferred to the DRC on March ...