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Young v. Curtin

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

June 30, 2015

ROGER YOUNG, Petitioner,
v.
CINDI CURTIN, Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VICTORIA A. ROBERTS, District Judge.

Petitioner Roger Young, a state inmate incarcerated at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520(b), imposed by a Wayne County Circuit Court jury.

Now before the Court is Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. Respondent argues that the petition was not timely filed and, alternatively, that the claims added to the petition by amendment are untimely. The Court finds that the original petition was timely filed but the claims added by amended were not. The Court denies the motion with respect to the claims in the original petition and grants the motion on the claims added by amendment.

I.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. On April 29, 2003, he was sentenced to 22 to 40 years' imprisonment. Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. People v. Young, No. 248646, 2004 WL 2102039 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2009). The Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal. 472 Mich. 937 (Mich. June 28, 2005).

Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court on August 4, 2006. He then sought to withdraw his motion. The trial court advised him to instead amend his motion, which he did in December 2006. The motion was denied on May 23, 2007. 9/12/07 Opinion, People v. Young, No. 02-014742-01, ECF No. 11-23 Pg ID 1995-2002. Petitioner's applications for leave to appeal the trial court's decision were denied by the Michigan Court of Appeals, People v. Young, No. 281435 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2008), and the Michigan Supreme Court, People v. Young, 482 Mich. 1030 (Oct. 27, 2008). The Michigan Supreme Court also denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. People v. Young, 483 Mich. 883 (Jan. 27, 2009).

On March 2, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He then moved to stay the petition so that he could file a second motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. The Court granted the motion on June 23, 2010. Petitioner filed a second motion for relief from judgment on August 10, 2010. The motion was denied on September 21, 2012. Order, People v. Young, No. 02-014742-01, ECF No. 24-14 Pg ID 2983-84. Both state appellate courts denied Petitioner leave to appeal the trial court's decision. People v. Young, No. 315348 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2013); People v. Young, 495 Mich. 947 (Mich. Feb. 28, 2014).

Petitioner then returned to this Court and moved to reopen this habeas corpus proceeding. The Court granted the request and the matter was reopened on August 4, 2014.

II.

A motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 presumes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (internal quotes omitted).

A fact is "material" if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2001). "Materiality" is determined by the substantive law claim. Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2000). An issue is "genuine" if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Henson v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, " there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir. 2000). Thus a factual dispute which "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative" will not defeat a motion for summary judgment which is properly supported. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir. 1999).

The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden to inform the district court of the basis for its motion, and identify portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Univ., Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 2002). The party opposing the motion then may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. If the non-moving party, after sufficient opportunity for discovery, is unable to meet his or her burden of proof, summary judgment is clearly proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.

III.

Respondent argues that summary judgment should be granted because the original petition was not timely filed, or, in the alternative, that summary judgment should be granted as ...


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