United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. Quist, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Phillip J. Green United States Magistrate Judge
a pro se civil action brought by Imam Saabir
Abdullah (T.D.A.). Plaintiff lists the following defendants
in the caption of his complaint: the City of Grand Rapids,
the Grand Rapids Police Chief, Deputy Chief Daniel Savage,
Deputy Chief David Kiddle, Lt. Mark Ostapowicz, Officer
Donald Lake, the Grand Rapids City Manager, the Grand Rapids
Administrative Services' Managing Director, the Grand
Rapids Treasurer, the Michigan Secretary of State, the
Michigan Attorney General, and the United States Attorney
General. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1-2). Plaintiff asks this Court to
issue a Writ of Mandamus “compelling Donald Lake, City
of Grand Rapids GRPD, [and] City of Grand Rapids to honor the
Default Judgment.” (Id. at 4,
Court has granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, in light of his indigence. (ECF No. 3). Under
the provisions of federal law, PUB. L. No. 104-134, 110 STAT.
1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any action
brought in forma pauperis if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2); see Davis-Bey v. Michigan, No. 14-12167,
2014 WL 2746086, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 17, 2014).
I. Factual Allegations
states that he is of “The Abdullah Nation, ” and
he identifies himself as “Aboriginal Indigenous
Moorish-American; possessing Free-hold by Inheritance and
Primogeniture Status; standing squarely Affirmed, aligned and
bound to the Zodiac Constitution.” (Id.,
PageID.2). The complaint is largely gibberish with a
hodgepodge of citations to nineteenth century treaties that
were purportedly entered into between the United States and
Morocco. (Id., PageID.2-3).
discern no rational statement of any claim against any of the
named defendants. Plaintiff has attached several
“Exhibits” to the complaint, one of which appears
to be a report of Officer Lake regarding a November 25, 2014,
encounter he had with plaintiff. (ECF No. 1-1). According to
the report, the officer questioned plaintiff about a
“weed whipper and live trap” plaintiff was
carrying on a public street. (Id.). After
questioning plaintiff and checking his identification, the
officer allowed plaintiff to leave. (Id.).
apparently filed a complaint against Officer Lake with the
Grand Rapids Police Department Civilian Appeals Board.
(See ECF No. 1-3). Plaintiff attaches a copy of a
letter from the Assistant City Attorney, dated March 30,
2015, indicating that she enclosed the Board's decision
“affirming the conclusion reached by the Internal
Affairs Unit relative to your complaint.:” (ECF No.
1-3). Plaintiff does not provide a copy of his complaint to
the Board, nor does he provide a copy of the Board's
significantly, plaintiff does not identify the Court that
purportedly issued the “Default Judgment, ” much
less does he identify the case in which it was purportedly
entered. There appears to be nothing in the complaint that
provides a jurisdictional or factual basis for this Court to
grant the relief he seeks.
Failure to State a Claim
complaint that fails to allege “ ‘enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'
” must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Michigan
Dep't of Educ., 615 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A plaintiff must ‘plead [ ]
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.' ” Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d
890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A plaintiff falls short if
he pleads facts ‘merely consistent with the
defendant's liability' or if the alleged facts do not
‘permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct[.]'” Albrecht,
617 F.3d at 893 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79).
“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In
applying these standards, the court must read plaintiff's
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519 (1972), and accept plaintiff's factual
allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or
wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
33 (1992). Applying these standards, I recommend that the
Court dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state
has failed to plead facts sufficient to state a claim on
which relief can be granted against any defendant. Conclusory
allegations and legal conclusions masquerading as factual
allegations are insufficient to sustain a claim. See In
re Omnicare, Inc Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 469 (6th
Cir. 2014); see also Sanford v. Jail, No.
2:16-cv-11311, 2016 WL 4475019 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2016);
Blackmun v. Michigan, No. 1:16-cv-374, 2016 WL
2865577 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2016).