United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131. The
Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the Court is required
to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if
the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's claims under the Eighth Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. The Court also
will dismiss Plaintiff's damages claim under Title I of
the ADA. In addition, the Court will dismiss Defendant
Unknown Party. The Court will serve the remainder of the
amended complaint on Defendants Sage, Gilkie and Braman.
Lonnie Dean Bradshaw presently is incarcerated with the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Richard A.
Handlon Correctional Facility (MTU). He sues MTU
Classifications Director (unknown) Sage, MTU C-Unit Assistant
Resident Unit Supervisor (unknown) Gilkie; MTU Deputy Warden
(unknown) Braman; and an unknown doctor who worked at the
Duane Waters Hospital in March 1999 (Unknown Party).
alleges that, in 1992 and 1993, he had cancer of an
unspecified nature, for which he underwent surgery and
radiation treatment. As a result of the surgery, he incurred
damages to two nerve centers, the inguinal and femoral
March 2, 1999, Plaintiff entered MDOC quarantine in Jackson,
Michigan. He was seen at the Duane Waters Hospital by
Defendant Unknown Party. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Unknown Party neglected his medical care, apparently by
failing to provide nerve medication and neglecting to place
information in Plaintiff's record about his need to be
placed in a bottom bunk. As a result, Plaintiff did not
receive a bottom-bunk detail until 2016.
1999 and 2015, Plaintiff was assigned a job on the yard crew,
which required him to pick up papers and occasionally mow the
grass or shovel snow. Plaintiff alleges that, by working this
job, he gradually became able to walk much better and his
limp was reduced. On September 3, 2015, Plaintiff was
transferred to MTU. On October 20, 2015, Plaintiff was
assigned a porter job. Plaintiff, however, could not perform
the job duties of a porter, because the job required him to
work too long. On November 23, 2015, after Plaintiff quit his
porter job, Defendants Gilkie and Sage placed him on
“double-O punishment, ” causing him to be
confined to his cell from 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., Monday
through Friday. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 8, PageID.32; Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Plaintiff has remained on unemployable
status since that time and has not been assigned to a job
that he can perform.
alleges that he tried to convince Gilkie, Sage and Braman
that he should be assigned a job in the yard, but they did
not change his assignment. As the result of being required to
be in his cell for most of the day, unable to exercise or
move freely, Plaintiff allegedly has been unable to engage in
the self-care of working. He alleges that the inactivity has
caused an increase in the symptoms arising from his nerve
injuries: increased pain, increased weakness, and aggravation
of his limp. In February 2016, Plaintiff went to health care
about his increasing symptoms. He was prescribed a
bottom-bunk detail. Plaintiff claims that, despite the
detail, he has not been placed in a bottom bunk.
Count I of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
have violated his rights under Title I of the ADA, which
prohibits discrimination in employment. In Count II, he
contends that Defendants' actions have violated Title II
of the ADA, by depriving him of the ability to participate in
programs on the basis of his disability. In Count III,
Plaintiff claims that Defendants have subjected him to cruel
and unusual punishment by ignoring his reports that he was
being negatively affected by the inability to work. In Count
IV, he asserts that Defendant Unknown Party violated the
Eighth Amendment by neglecting to indicate on Plaintiff's
medical record that he had ongoing medical issues related to
nerve damage caused during surgery. In Count V, Plaintiff
claims that Defendants have violated the Equal Protection
Clause by “punishing” him for doing a job that is
ordinarily an “ask and get job.” (Id.,
PageID.35.) In Count VI, Plaintiff argues that he was put on
unemployable status and confined to his cell during work
hours without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Finally, in Count VII, Petitioner contends that
Defendants committed the tort of negligence by denying him an
opportunity to work on the yard crew, aggravating his medical
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, including a clearing
of his work record and a transfer to another prison, together
with compensatory and punitive damages.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”) The court
must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the
plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“‘probability requirement, ' . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged
- but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action ...