Circuit Court LC No. 13-011493-FC
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
Dakota Lee Turn, appeals by leave granted from the trial
court's order of restitution following his plea of guilty
to a charge of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL
750.83. The trial court sentenced Turn as a third habitual
offender, MCL 769.11, to serve 18 ½ to 35 years in
prison for the conviction. Additionally, the court ordered
Turn to pay restitution to Nathaniel Scramlin, the individual
he assaulted, and Scramlin's insurer. On appeal, Turn
challenges the court's ability to order him to pay
restitution to Scramlin for his loss of accumulated sick,
personal, and vacation time. Because we conclude that the
William Van Regenmorter Crime Victim's Rights Act, MCL
780.751 et seq., requires full restitution to crime
victims, we affirm.
the plea hearing, Turn admitted that he stabbed Scramlin
several times in the back and side. As a result of Turn's
assault, Scramlin was taken to the hospital, received
numerous stitches, remained hospitalized for two and a half
to three days, and, pursuant to his doctor's orders, was
unable to immediately return to work following his release
from the hospital.
sentencing, the trial court ordered Turn to pay $17, 744.44
in restitution. Turn moved for resentencing, challenging the
propriety of the restitution order. The trial court scheduled
a restitution hearing, where it heard testimony from
Scramlin. Following the hearing, the court ordered Turn to
pay $7, 957.86 to Scramlin's insurer for actual medical
expenses and $100 to Scramlin for the loss of his
jacket. The court ordered additional briefing and
allowed for the submission of additional evidence on the
question of whether Scramlin was entitled to restitution for
the loss of accumulated sick, personal, and vacation time
taken after the assault and, if so, how much he was entitled
undisputed that Scramlin, who was employed by the Michigan
Economic Development Corporation as a community assistance
specialist, had to use 112 hours of sick, personal, and
vacation time in order to recuperate from his injuries.
Scramlin was compensated by his employer at an after-tax rate
of $19.23 per hour for the time he used. Scramlin testified
that the time he used was no longer available. He also stated
that accumulated leave time was payable by his employer upon
termination of employment.
trial court concluded that Scramlin had only received
compensation for his time away from work by depleting his
accumulated sick, personal, and vacation time. The court
reasoned that the depletion of accumulated time represented a
loss to Scramlin, who could not use the time in the future,
either for its intended purpose or for monetary compensation
upon termination of his employment. The court found that in
order to award "full restitution" as required by
MCL 780.766(2) Scramlin needed to be compensated for the loss
of accumulated leave time. The court found that the economic
benefit of the lost time was $2, 153.77.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to
reimburse Scramlin for his lost sick, personal, and vacation
time. We review a trial court's factual findings related
to an order of restitution for clear error. People v
Garrison, 495 Mich. 362, 366-367; 852 N.W.2d 45 (2014).
A factual finding is clearly erroneous where "the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction
that an error occurred." People v Fawaz, 299
Mich.App. 55, 60; 829 N.W.2d 259 (2012) (citation and
quotation omitted). A trial court's restitution order is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Gubachy, 272 Mich.App. 706, 708; 728 N.W.2d 891 (2006).
"An abuse of discretion occurs when the court chooses an
outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes." People v Pinkney, ___
Mich.App. ___, ___; ___ N.W.2d ___ (2016) (Docket No.
325856); slip op at 11 (citation omitted). Questions of
statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.
Gubachy, 272 Mich.App. at 708.
Michigan, a crime victim has a constitutional "right to
restitution." Const 1963, art 1, § 24. The right to
restitution is further set forth in both section 16 of the
Crime Victim's Rights Act, MCL 780.766, and in the
general restitution statute, MCL 769.1a. Both statutes define
"victim" as "an individual who suffers direct
or threatened physical, financial, or emotional harm as a
result of the commission" of a crime. MCL 780.766(1);
MCL 769.1a(1)(b). Further, both statutes provide that a
sentencing court must order a defendant convicted of a crime
to "make full restitution to any victim of the
defendant's course of conduct that gives rise to the
conviction[.]" MCL 780.766(2); MCL 769.1a(2). Our