United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
SCOTT A. LANTZY, Plaintiff,
CORIZON MEDICAL SERVICES, ET AL., Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
G. EDMUNDS DISTRICT JUDGE.
a pro se prisoner civil rights case. Michigan state
prisoner Scott A. Lantzy is incarcerated at the Carson City
Correctional Facility in Michigan. He asserts claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to
proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for this action.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). In his complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from several food-related
allergies, but has not been provided with allergy-free meals.
The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted and will be summarily dismissed.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set
forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” as well as
“a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957) and
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). While this notice pleading standard
does not require “detailed” factual allegations,
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, it does require more than
the bare assertion of legal conclusions or “an
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Id. quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Id. quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the
filing fee for this action due to his indigence. Under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court
is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it
determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, the Court is required to
dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government
entities, officers, and employees that it finds to be
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989).
state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege
that (1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 155-57, 98 S.Ct. 1729 (1978). A pro se
civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594
claims that he is not receiving allergen-free foods at his
present place of incarceration, Carson City Correctional
Facility. He names two defendants, Corizon Medical Services
and Sherman Campbell, who is the warden of Carson City
Correctional Facility. Plaintiff's allegations against
these defendants are based upon their supervisory authority.
doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in
§ 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto supervisory
personnel, see Monell v. Department of Social Services of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978),
unless it is shown “that the supervisor encouraged the
specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly
participated in it.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729
F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). A supervisor's failure to
supervise, train or control an employee is not actionable
under § 1983, unless the plaintiff shows “the
official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or
knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct . .
.” Hays v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d
869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Shehee v.
Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A]
supervisory official's failure to supervise, control or
train the offending individual is not actionable unless the
supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in
it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
fails to allege that defendants had any direct involvement in
the meals Plaintiff is served or that defendants engaged in
any “‘active unconstitutional
behavior'” rather than a “‘mere failure
to act.'” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 200, quoting
Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th
Cir. 1998). He does not allege that defendants were even
aware of any misconduct by any employee, but, even if he did,
“simple awareness of employees' misconduct does not
lead to supervisor liability.” Leary v.
Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff does not allege that defendants Corizon Medical
Services or Campbell were actively involved in any of the
alleged wrongdoing. The Court, therefore, finds that
Plaintiff's claims are insufficient to state a claim for
relief against either defendant.
reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law and
fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's ...