United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read
Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
Vincent Ongori, a state prisoner currently confined at the
Chippewa County Jail, filed this pro se civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant
Jennifer K. Hawkins. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
on or about August to September 2015, as a Certified
Electronic Recorder for the 75th District Court, Defendant
Hawkins committed perjury in relation to Case Nos.
15-P212680A and 15-P212680B by falsely certifying certain
documents as true. Plaintiff seeks to have Defendant Hawkins
criminally prosecuted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement, ' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549
(6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for
vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive
rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983
is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly
infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
claim against Defendant Hawkins arose from criminal
proceedings against him in the state court. The federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has
the burden of proving the Court's jurisdiction.
United States v. Horizon Healthcare, 160 F.3d 326,
329 (6th Cir. 1998). Even where subject matter jurisdiction
is not raised by the parties, the Court must consider the
issue sua sponte. See City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511 (1973); Norris v.
Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1998); Mickler
v. Nimishillen & Tuscarawas Ry. Co., 13 F.3d 184,
189 (6th Cir. 1993).
noted above, Plaintiff seeks to have Defendant Hawkins
prosecuted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1623.
However, the statutes under which Plaintiff brings his
perjury claim bar a private right of action and are available
only in criminal matters. Nicole Energy Servs., Inc. v.
McClatchey, No. 2:08-CV-0463, 2010 WL 55718, at *6 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 4, 2010). Plaintiff cannot compel the enforcement
of criminal statutes against Defendant Hawkins. As a private
citizen, Plaintiff “‘lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.'” Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S.
54, 63 (1986) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 619 (1973)).
conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's action will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. §
Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would
be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court
dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis
for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the
Court will assess the $505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant
to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at
610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in
forma pauperis, e.g., by ...