United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Janet T. Neff, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
S. CARMODY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
matter is before the Court on Defendant Karnitz's
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 67). Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends
that Defendant's motion be granted and this action
initiated this action on August 28, 2014, against several
medical care providers and prison officials including Mark
Karnitz. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff subsequently amended his
complaint. (ECF No. 10). In his amended complaint, Plaintiff
asserted several claims including the claim that Defendant
Karnitz refused to provide him with a special accommodation
for “athletic style” shoes. Plaintiff alleges
that this action violated his rights under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Eighth
Amendment. All of Plaintiff's claims, save his claim that
Defendant Karnitz refused to provide him with a special
accommodation for “athletic style” shoes, have
been dismissed. Defendant Karnitz now moves for summary
judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party moving for summary
judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating “that
the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for
discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of
his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398
F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party
demonstrates that “there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case, ” the
non-moving party “must identify specific facts that can
be established by admissible evidence, which demonstrate a
genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin
College, 440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006).
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the party opposing the summary
judgment motion “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The existence
of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of
the non-moving party's position is insufficient.
Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir.
2005). The non-moving party “may not rest upon [his]
mere allegations, ” but must instead present
“significant probative evidence” establishing
that “there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir.
the non-moving party cannot defeat a properly supported
motion for summary judgment by “simply arguing that it
relies solely or in part upon credibility
determinations.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings
Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2004). Rather,
the non-moving party “must be able to point to some
facts which may or will entitle him to judgment, or refute
the proof of the moving party in some material portion, and.
. .may not merely recite the incantation, ‘Credibility,
' and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve
factually uncontested proof.” Id. at 353-54.
In sum, summary judgment is appropriate “against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d at 735.
moving party without the burden of proof need only show that
the opponent cannot sustain his burden at trial, a moving
party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially
higher hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552,
561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the burden,
“his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold
that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for
the moving party.” Calderone v. United States,
799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit has
emphasized that the party with the burden of proof
“must show the record contains evidence satisfying the
burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful
that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve
it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561. Accordingly,
summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of
persuasion “is inappropriate when the evidence is
susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the
trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541, 553 (1999).
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment applies not only to punishment imposed by the
state, but also to deprivations which occur during
imprisonment and are not part of the sentence imposed.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-02 (1976).
Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment protects against the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, the existence of
which is evidenced by the “deliberate
indifference” to an inmate's “serious medical
needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-06;
Napier v. Madison County, Kentucky, 238
F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001).
analysis by which a defendant's conduct is evaluated
consists of two-steps. First, the Court must determine,
objectively, whether the alleged deprivation was sufficiently
serious. A “serious medical need, ” sufficient to
implicate the Eighth Amendment, is “one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that
is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for a doctor's attention.”
Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. ...