United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen United States District
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
E. Rosen, United States District Judge.
above-captioned matter is presently before the Court on
Defendant Lear Corporation's Motion for reconsideration
of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of October
28, 2016 remanding the case to Texas state court due to
Lear's failure to establish complete diversity of
citizenship among the parties. The specific defect which led
to the Court's remand of the case was Lear's failure
to identify all of the partners of Plaintiff Ragar
Transportation, Ltd. and the constituent partners and/or
members of Ragar's sub-members. Lear alleged only that
Plaintiff Ragar Transportation Ltd. is a Texas limited
partnership whose general partner is Ragar Transportation
Mgt, LLC. No limited partner was identified.
general partner, Ragar Transportation Mgt, LLC, was also
identified as a Texas limited liability company. No member of
the LLC, however, was identified. Lear identified only the
LLC's “registered agent” and its
“manager, ” both of which are irrelevant with
respect to the question of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. See Smith v. Kenan Transport LLC, 2009
WL 1010251 (N.D.Ga. Apr. 14, 2009); see also Roe v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 2011 WL 2516511 (C.D. Cal. June 22,
argued in its Response that the information concerning the
citizenship of Ragar, its partners, members, and sub-members
is available to Plaintiff Ragar, intimating that Ragar should
be called upon to provide that information to the Court.
However, it was Lear's burden to establish the existence
of federal jurisdiction. “The removing party bears the
burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, and all doubts
should be resolved against removal.” Harnden v.
Jayco, Inc., 496 F.3d 579, 581-82 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438
F.3d 544, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2006)); Certain
Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's London, England v.
Layne, 26 F.3d 39, 41 (6thCir.1994); Her
Majesty The Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City
of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir.1989);
McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257
(11th Cir. 2002). Lear failed to meet this burden.
attempt to prevent remand, Lear suggested that the Court
retain jurisdiction and permit jurisdictional discovery.
However, as the Court explained in its October 28, 2016
Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court cannot retain what it
never possessed. It was Lear's burden to prove the
Court's jurisdiction. In the absence of such proof, the
Court must presume that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citing Turner v. Bank of North
America, 4 U.S. 8, 11 (1799)).
Court further noted that “allowing post-removal
discovery regarding diversity would “frustrat[e] the
limited nature of federal jurisdiction by encouraging
defendants to remove, at best, prematurely, and at worst, in
cases in which they will never be able to establish
jurisdiction.” Knox Hills LLC v. Ambac Assur.
Corp., 2015 WL 1298622 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2015) (quoting
Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1217
(11th Cir. 2007)); see also May v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 751 F.Supp.2d 946, 949-55 (E.D. Ky. 2010)
(“[J]urisdictional discovery is anathema to the limited
nature of federal jurisdiction and the need to respect the
authority of state courts.”) A removing defendant
“must be able to demonstrate, at the moment of removal,
that the case meets the requirements for federal
jurisdiction.” May, 751 F.Supp.2d at 955.
Lear's inability to do so did not entitle it to
now moves for reconsideration of the Court's October 28,
2016 Order. The Court doubts that it has jurisdiction to
entertain Defendant's motion. See Brierly v.
Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 521 n.
1 (6th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). The Sixth
Circuit did not reach this issue in Brierly (nor has
it been called upon to address the issue in any subsequent
cases), but it noted in dicta in Brierly
that a number of other circuits have done so and have
concluded the entry of an order of remand divests a federal
district court of all jurisdiction and precludes
consideration of a motion to remand. See id.
arguendo the Court does retain jurisdiction to
consider Defendant's motion, the Court nonetheless
concludes that Lear has failed to demonstrate its entitlement
requirements for the granting of motions for reconsideration
are set forth in Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule
7.1(h), which, in relevant part, provides:
Generally, and without restricting the court's
discretion, the court will not grant motions for rehearing or
reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled
upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable
implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable
defect by which the court and the parties and other persons
entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also
show that correcting the defect will result in a different
disposition of the case.
in order to prevail on a motion for reconsideration, the
movant must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which
the Court has been misled, he must also show that a different
disposition of the case must result from a correction of that
defect. A “palpable defect” is “a defect
that is obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest or
plain.” United States v. Lockette, 328
F.Supp.2d 682, 684 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Moreover, a motion that
merely presents the same issues already ruled upon by the
Court -- either expressly or by reasonable implication --
will not be granted. L.R. 7.1(h)(3); see also Flanagan v.
Shamo, 111 F.Supp.2d 892, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
Civ. P. 59(e) also may be used as a vehicle for seeking
reconsideration of a court's prior ruling. Generally,
there are three situations which justify reconsideration
under Rule 59(e): (1) to correct a clear error of law; (2) to
account for newly discovered evidence; (3) to accommodate an
intervening change in controlling law; or (4) to prevent
manifest injustice. Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428
F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005); see also GenCorp, Inc. v.
Am. Int'l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir.
1999). However, like the Local Rule, motions under Rule 59(e)
“are not intended as a vehicle to relitigate previously
considered issues; should not be utilized to submit evidence
which could have been previously submitted in the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and are not the proper vehicle to
attempt to obtain a reversal of a judgment by offering the
same arguments previously presented.” Kenneth Henes
Special Projects Procurement v. Continental Biomass
Industries, Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 721, 726 (E.D. Mich.
2000). “A motion to alter or reconsider a judgment is
an extraordinary remedy and should be granted
sparingly.” Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. ...