United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
CHARLES B. GLASSTETTER, et al., Plaintiffs,
INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DISMISSAL
H. CLELAND UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the court is a Motion to Dismiss by Defendant General
Motors, LLC, ("GM") seeking dismissal of the sole
remaining claim. (Dkt. #26.) This court entered an order and
opinion dismissing all other Defendants on the basis that no
collective bargaining agreement had been breached, but GM did
not join in that motion. (Dkt. #22.) Plaintiffs have filed a
response, (Dkt. #28), and Defendants have filed a reply,
(Dkt. #30). After reviewing the briefs, the court concludes
that a hearing is unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. LR
7.1(f)(2). For the following reasons, the court will dismiss
Plaintiffs' claim against GM.
facts and procedural history of this case and its
companion were described in detail in this
court's earlier Opinion and Order Granting Dismissal,
familiarity with which is presumed. (Dkt. #22.)
Plaintiffs' remaining claim alleges a violation of
Section 301 of the Labor and Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185 etseq., commonly described as a
"hybrid Section 301" claim. In its earlier opinion,
this court held that Plaintiffs could not maintain a hybrid
Section 301 claim against Defendant labor unions because they
had not sufficiently alleged a prerequisite: that the
employer had breached a collective bargaining agreement.
Armed with this favorable holding, GM now argues that res
judicata requires dismissal of the same claim against
it, the remaining Defendant employer. Without providing
additional factual allegations, Plaintiffs respond that GM
breached the 1993 GM-UAW Collective Bargaining Agreement when
it unilaterally altered Plaintiffs' seniority dates, and
that Plaintiffs are not necessarily required to proceed
against the labor union in order to succeed against their
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Under the Rule, the court construes the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true. League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527
(6th Cir. 2007). This standard requires more than bare
assertions of legal conclusions. Bovee v. Coopers &
Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001).
"[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Any claim for relief
must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
"Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need
only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'"
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide
sufficient facts to "state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a
"probability requirement, ' but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted
unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555.) Additionally, on a motion to dismiss, a court
is usually limited to the complaint and attached exhibits,
but it may also consider "public records, items
appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to
the defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are
referred to in the complaint and are central to the claims
contained therein." Erie County v. Morton Salt,
Inc., 702 F.3d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Bassett v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n., 528
F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)).
responsive briefing does not add meaningfully to the
arguments advanced when this court granted dismissal of the
claims against the other Defendants. Their assertion that
they should be permitted to maintain their claim against GM
because it breached the 1993 GM-UAW Collective Bargaining
Agreement ignores this court's earlier determination that
the agreement had been superseded by subsequent agreements,
such that "Plaintiffs simply have not made a plausible
case that GM breached any relevant agreement [and] may not
reach into the distant past to revive provisions of
inapplicable collective bargaining agreements to support
their claim." (Dkt. #22, Pg. ID 594.) Plaintiffs'
brief does not identify any other agreement that could
support their theory. A Section 301 claim is necessarily
predicated upon a breach of a collective bargaining agreement
between a labor union and an employer, and since Plaintiffs
have not sufficiently alleged a breach by GM, their claim
will be dismissed. The fact that a Plaintiff who
succeeds in alleging a breach by the employer is not
also required to proceed against the labor union is
foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss (Dkt. #26) is GRANTED. A separate judgment will
See Kosa v. Int'l UAW,
No. 13-11786, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176611, *24 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 17, 2013); Kosa v. Int'l UAW, No. 13-11786,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134544, ...