United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Anthony P. Patti Mag. Judge.
AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO THE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION , ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION , DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT , AND GRANTING THE
COMMISSION'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
E. LEVY United States District Judge
28, 2016, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and
Recommendation, recommending that the Court deny plaintiff
Abdullah Shrif Amir's motion for summary judgment (Dkt.
18) and grant the Commissioner of Social Security's
motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 19). (Dkt. 22.) Plaintiff
timely filed objections (Dkt. 23), and the Commissioner filed
a response. (Dkt. 25.) For the reasons set forth below,
plaintiff's objections are denied, and the Magistrate
Judge's Report and Recommendation to deny plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment and grant the Commission's
motion for summary judgment is adopted in full.
Court has reviewed the background in light of the record and
finds that the Magistrate Judge's description of this
case is accurate. In addition, plaintiff has not specifically
objected to the background as described in the Report and
Recommendation. It is thus adopted in full. (Dkt. 22 at 2-8.)
Any disputes as to the facts are addressed in the analysis.
applicant for disability benefits who is not satisfied with
the Commissioner's final decision may obtain review in
federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district
court “must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions
absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to
apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591,
595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's
decision, and may also choose to remand the case for
rehearing when appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Commissioner's findings of fact are given substantial
deference on review and are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d
789, 795 (6th Cir. 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less
than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). If there is
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's
decision, the district court must affirm it even if
substantial evidence also supports a contrary conclusion.
Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007);
Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir.
2003); see also Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence, “it must
be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the
matter differently . . . and even if substantial evidence
also supports the opposite conclusion”).
deciding whether there is substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner's factual findings, the district court is
limited to an examination of the record and should consider
the record as a whole. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13;
Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 974
F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). However, neither the
Commissioner nor the reviewing court must discuss every piece
of evidence in the administrative record. Kornecky v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th
Magistrate Judge has submitted a Report and Recommendation
and a party has filed timely objections, the district court
conducts a de novo review of those parts of the
Report and Recommendation to which the party objects. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by relying on a
vocational expert's testimony because plaintiff's
limitations place him between two grid rules that both direct
a finding of disabled. (Dkt. 23 at 2-3.) According to
plaintiff, reliance on the vocational expert is only
appropriate when a plaintiff's limitations place him
between grid rules that direct opposite findings of disabled
and not disabled. (Id. at 2.)
plaintiff argues that he was between grid rules because the
findings placed him between sedentary and light work, but
even the applicable light-work grid would direct a finding of
disabled. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 2, Table 2, § 202.09).) Rule 202.09, cited
by plaintiff, applies if plaintiff has the following
limitations: ability to perform light work, illiteracy or
inability to communicate in English, previous unskilled work,
and an age range approaching advanced age (fifty to
fifty-four). 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Table
2, § 202.09.
argument assumes that plaintiff should have been considered
approaching advanced age. But at the time of the ALJ's
decision, plaintiff was forty-nine. (See Dkt. 13-2
at 35 (“[H]e's 49 now, he'll be 50 next
spring.”); see also Id. at 24-25, 30
(plaintiff born May 14, 1964, hearing decision February 6,
2014).) The Magistrate Judge rejected plaintiff's
argument that he should have been considered within the fifty
to fifty-four age category. (Dkt. 22 at 14-15.) As set forth
below in the analysis of objection 2, the Magistrate
Judge's decision was not clearly erroneous. Thus,
plaintiff's first objection is denied.
to support plaintiff's first objection, plaintiff argues
that the Magistrate Judge erred by accepting the ALJ's
“mechanical approach to [plaintiff]'s age
category.” (Dkt. 23 at 3-7.) According to plaintiff,
“the ALJ was required to consider [plaintiff]'s