United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
THEODORE G. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff,
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, ET AL., Defendant.
ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL AND REVOKING ORDER OF
G. EDMUNDS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Theodore G. Williams is presently confined at the Center for
Forensic Psychiatry in Saline, Michigan. Plaintiff has filed
a pro se complaint challenging his continued
confinement. Plaintiff is proceeding without prepayment of
the filing fee in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1). The Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),  because
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata and Heck v. Humprhey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). Further, on December 5, 2016, the Court issued an
Order of Reference to United States Magistrate Judge. The
Court hereby revokes that Order.
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set
forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” as well as
“a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) and Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2)). The notice pleading standard requires more than the
bare assertion of legal conclusions or “an unadorned,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Id. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the
filing fee for this action. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), the court is required to
sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis
complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that
the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §
October 1967, Plaintiff pleaded guilty in Michigan state
court to first-degree murder. Williams v. Meyer, 346
F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 2003)). Prior to sentencing, he was
designated a “criminal sexual psychopath” under
the Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act (CSPA), Mich. Comp. Laws
§ § 780.501-.509 (repealed Aug. 1, 1968), and
committed to the custody of a state mental hospital.
Id. He was discharged in September 1973, but
returned to custody in 1979 when the Michigan Supreme Court
determined that his release had been improper. People v.
Williams, 406 Mich. 909 (1979). He has remained in the
custody of the Michigan Department of Mental Health since
1979. Plaintiff has filed several petitions for release in
state court and, in 1993, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in this Court, arguing that his continued incarcerated
under the CSPA violated his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause. See Williams v.
Meyer, No. 93-cv-75495. The district court denied the
petition and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
denial. Williams v. Meyer, 254 F. App'x 459 (6th
has now filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, again
challenging his continued confinement under the CSPA. Under
the doctrine of res judicata, a “valid and
final judgment on a claim precludes a second action on that
claim or any part of it.” J.Z.G. Resources, Inc. v.
Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1996).
Res judicata serves “not only to bar the
parties from relitigating issues that were actually
litigated but also to bar them from relitigating issues that
could have been raised in an earlier action.”
Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiff's claim
regarding his the validity of his continued confinement under
the CSPA already has been litigated. Therefore, Plaintiff may
not relitigate this claim in this Court.
a claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a
state prisoner challenging a condition of his imprisonment.
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973).
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the
Supreme Court established that a state prisoner does not
state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his
imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily
render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless
the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on
direct appeal, called into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2254, or otherwise invalidated. Id. at 486-87.
Plaintiff seeks release from continued custody. This claim is
not properly filed under § 1983.
IT IS ORDERED that the December 5, 2016 Order of Reference to
United States Magistrate Judge is REVOKED and the complaint
Court finds an appeal in this case would be frivolous and not
taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Therefore, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an appeal
from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3). Nevertheless, should Plaintiff decide to
file a notice of appeal, he may seek leave from the Court of
Appeals to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(5).