United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
S. CARMODY United States Magistrate Judge.
an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's
claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of
the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed
in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order
of final judgment. (ECF No. 9). Section 405(g) limits the
Court to a review of the administrative record and provides
that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner
has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning
of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes
that the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's
decision is affirmed.
Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the
Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the
administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v.
Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301,
303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social
security case is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her
decision and whether there exists in the record substantial
evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v.
Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679,
681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo
review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide
questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745
F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is
charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for
disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided
they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of
Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir.
1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347
(6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the
evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record
as a whole and take into account whatever in the record
fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v.
Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962,
963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the
substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a
zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either
way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted). This standard affords to the administrative
decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a
decision supported by substantial evidence will not be
reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a
contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347;
Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
was 34 years of age on his alleged disability onset date.
(PageID.329). He successfully completed high school and
previously worked as a truck driver. (PageID.217). Plaintiff
applied for benefits on October 29, 2013, alleging that he
had been disabled since October 22, 2013, due to bi-polar
disorder, depression, anxiety, and a left-shoulder
impairment. (PageID.327-38, 357). Plaintiff's
applications were denied, after which time he requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
April 8, 2015, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Thomas Walters
with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational
expert. (PageID.222-44). In a written decision dated April
22, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff
was not disabled. (PageID.209-18). The Appeals Council
declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it
the Commissioner's final decision in the matter.
(PageID.20-25). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review
of the ALJ's decision.
OF THE ALJ'S DECISION
social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential
process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in
the review, no further finding is required. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations
also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional
impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are
considered in determining his residual functional capacity.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely
on Plaintiff's shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden
by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he
is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, perform
any other substantial gainful employment existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. See 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528.
While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step
five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four
of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning
capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ
determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears
the burden of proof).
determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) left shoulder
rotator cuff status post repair; (2) bipolar disorder; (3)
depression; and (4) anxiety, severe impairments that whether
considered alone or in combination with other impairments,
failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment
identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20
C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.211-14).
With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to
perform light work subject to the following limitations: (1)
he cannot perform reaching or lifting above the shoulder with
his left arm; (2) he is limited to simple, routine,
repetitive tasks free of fast-paced production requirements;
(3) the work can only involve simple work-related decisions
and routine work place changes; (4) he cannot have contact
with the public and only occasional contact with co-workers
and supervisors; and (5) he will be on task at least 90
percent of the time. (PageID.214).
found that Plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work at
which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner
to establish by substantial evidence that a significant
number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff
could perform, his limitations notwithstanding. See
Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not
required to question a vocational expert on this issue,
“a finding supported by substantial evidence that a
claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform
specific jobs” is needed to meet the burden.
O'Banner v. Sec'y of Health and Human
Services, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis
added). This standard requires more than mere intuition or
conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific
jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735
F.2d at 964. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question vocational
experts in an attempt to determine whether there exist a
significant number of jobs which a particular claimant can
perform, his limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case
here, as the ALJ questioned a vocational expert.
vocational expert testified that there existed approximately
130, 000 jobs in the national economy which an individual
with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, such limitations
notwithstanding. (PageID.239-43). This represents a
significant number of jobs. See Born v. Sec'y of
Health and Human Services, 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir.
1990); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir.
1988); Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security,