Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Christenson v. City of Roseville

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

January 24, 2017

JAMES CHRISTENSON, et al., Plaintiffs,



         Pro se plaintiffs James Christenson and Christenson Law Trust assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants the City of Roseville, James Osterhout, and Timothy Tomlinson violated plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights. Courts liberally construe pro se complaints and do not hold them to the same stringent standards as formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

         This matter is presently before the Court on defendant's Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss and Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 21). Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, (Doc. 28), and a Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 29). The Court dispenses with oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter is GRANTED, the remaining motions are moot, and plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed.

         I. Background

         On July 17, 2014, the City of Roseville (the City) “red tagged” a house located at 27807 Garfield, Roseville, Michigan (the Property), signaling that the Property was not approved for occupancy. At that time, the Property was owned by Rech Realty. On November 13, 2014, Rech Realty permitted the City to inspect the Property. The inspection revealed multiple violations of the City of Roseville Building Code (Building Code). The City informed Rech Realty that “[a]ll violations must be corrected, reinspected and approved prior to the occupancy of this building.” (Doc. 21-2 at 4).

         On October 12, 2015, Osterhout sent a letter to Rech Realty noting the prior Building Code violations and requesting that it call to schedule a reinspection. But Rech Realty no longer owned the Property; it was sold to Brittany Westerlund and Merle Christenson on December 11, 2014. Westerlund, Merle Christenson, and plaintiff James Christenson subsequently wrote the City's mayor, explaining that they now owned the Property and did not believe that it should be subject to inspection.

         Westerlund and Merle Christenson transferred their interest in the Property to the Christenson Law Firm Trust 27807 on October 20, 2015. Thereafter, the City sent Westerlund a “Notice of Violation or NonConformity, ” stating that she had 10 days to correct the violations. The City's attorney, Tomlinson, wrote Westerlund and the Christensons explaining that the Property was not approved for occupancy because of the Building Code violations. (Doc. 1 at 38). Tomlinson's letter also stated that although they “may not have had knowledge of the violations, it is still your responsibility as the new property owner to ensure that the violations are corrected.” (Id.). “As a matter of law, each and every one of the violations in the section would constitute a criminal misdemeanor subject to 93 days in jail and/or up to a $500 fine.” (Id.). Tomlinson asserted that the City sought entry to re-inspect the violations to determine whether they had been corrected, noting that if they had not, Westerlund and the Christensons may be held liable. (Id.). James Christenson responded, stating that he did not consent to an inspection.

         On December 15, 2015, while inspecting a home adjacent to the Property, Osterhout observed that new electrical work had been completed, garbage placed outside the Property, and newly posted ‘No Trespassing' signs. Osterhout did not enter onto the Property, but merely observed these issues in plain view from the surrounding area. Osterhout thereafter sent a “Violation Notice” to “Christenson Law Trust 27807, ” notifying Plaintiffs that electrical work was done without the proper permit, (Doc. 1 at 42), and a letter stating that the Property appeared to be unlawfully occupied and requesting that Plaintiffs schedule an inspection. (Id. at 41). On December 21, 2015, Plaintiff James Christenson sent a letter to Glenn Sexton, the Director of the City's Building Department, insisting that the current Property owners did not consent to any inspection and that Osterhout had violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs filed this suit on December 23, 2015.

         II. Standard of Review

         Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), arguing that plaintiffs lack standing. Defendants' also move to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and seek summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court is “bound to consider the 12(b)(1) motion first, since the Rule 12(b)(6) challenge becomes moot if this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990). It is the plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. RMI Titanium Co v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996).

         Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction fall into two general categories: facial attacks and factual attacks.” United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.1994). “A facial attack is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading itself. On such a motion, the court must take the material allegations of the petition as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (emphasis in original). “A factual attack, on the other hand, is not a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading's allegations, but a challenge to the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction. On such a motion, no presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations” and “the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. (emphasis in original). Defendants' challenge to plaintiffs' standing is a factual attack. Thus, no presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations in the complaint. Id.

         III. Analysis

         Defendants argue that this action must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) because plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims. A plaintiff's lack of standing under Article III of the United States Constitution deprives a federal court of subject matter jurisdiction. Stalley v. Methodist Healthcare, 517 F.3d 911, 916 (6th Cir. 2008). “To satisfy the ‘case' or ‘controversy' requirement of Article III, which is the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered ‘injury in fact, ' that the injury is ‘fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-472 (1982)).

         An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal citations omitted). In pre-enforcement challenges, “a plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he alleges ‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.