United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Anthony P. Patti Mag. Judge.
ORDER DENYING OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
, ADOPTING IN PART REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION , AND
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
E. LEVY United States District Judge.
April 24, 2015, pro se plaintiff Eric Santifer filed
a complaint against defendants Inergy Automotive Systems, LLC
and Jim Rebbeck, arguing they wrongfully terminated him on
the basis of race. (Dkt. 1.) Defendants moved for summary
judgment. (Dkt. 29.) On August 12, 2016, the Magistrate Judge
issued a report and recommendation granting defendants'
motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 47.) On August 31, 2016,
plaintiff filed objections to the report and recommendation.
(Dkt. 48.) For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's
objections are denied, the report and recommendation is
adopted in part, and defendants' motion for summary
judgment is granted.
factual background that led plaintiff to file his complaint
has been set forth in detail in the report and recommendation
and it will not be repeated here. (See Dkt. 47 at
report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
following grounds. First, plaintiff's claim is time
barred, even if considered under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. (Dkt. 47 at 9-13.) Second, plaintiff has failed to
state a prima facie case of discrimination.
(Id. at 14-15.) Third, even if plaintiff stated a
prima facie case, he failed to rebut defendants'
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his
employment. (Id. at 16-19.) Fourth, as a matter of
law, defendant Rebbeck cannot be held liable because he was
not plaintiff's supervisor. (Id. at 19.)
objects to each of the recommendations in the report and
recommendation. (Dkt. 48.)
magistrate judge's report and recommendation is made
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[T]his
recommendation has no presumptive weight, ” and the
district judge “has the responsibility of making the
final determination.” Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John
Does 1-21, 286 F.R.D. 319, 320 (E.D. Mich. 2012). If a
party objects to part or all of the report and
recommendation, the district judge must review de novo those
parts to which the party has objected. Lardie v.
Birkett, 221 F.Supp.2d 806, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2002);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). De novo review “entails at least
a review of the evidence that faced the Magistrate
Judge.” Lardie, 221 F.Supp.2d at 807.
reviewing a report and recommendation, a court may
“accept, reject, or modify the findings or
recommendations.” Id. If the report and
recommendation is adopted after de novo review, the court
“need not state with specificity what it reviewed; it
is sufficient for the [c]ourt to say that it has engaged in a
de novo review.” Id.
objects to each of the reasons for granting defendants'
motion for summary judgment that the Magistrate Judge set
forth in the report and recommendation. (See
generally Dkt. 48.) Plaintiff first objects on the
ground that January 15, 2015 cannot serve as the
“official notification date” that would trigger
the ninety-day statute of limitations.
plaintiff alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
must file an administrative action with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) before filing a
complaint in federal court. Once the EEOC makes a final
decision, it will issue to the plaintiff a notice of his or
her right to sue (“RTS”), and the plaintiff must
file a civil suit in federal court within ninety days of
receiving the RTS. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c).
case, plaintiff argues he filed his complaint with this Court
within ninety days of receiving the RTS. On January 14, 2015,
the EEOC made a final determination in plaintiff's case,
finding it was “unable to conclude that the information
obtained [during its investigation of plaintiff's
complaint] establishes violations of” Title VII. (Dkt.
1 at 5.) That same day, the EEOC issued the RTS and
communicated with plaintiff that the RTS would be mailed on
January 15, 2015. (Dkt. 48 at 1.) The EEOC mailed the RTS,
dated January 14, 2015, to the address on record for
plaintiff, which was a P.O. Box that plaintiff
“regularly checked . . . on Saturdays.” (Dkt. 1