United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS  AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
G. Edmunds United States District Judge
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's application
to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's
application and affidavit and GRANTS his request to proceed
in forma pauperis.  For the reasons that follow,
however, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
standards governing in forma pauperis motions are
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The district court may
authorize the commencement of a civil action without the
prepayment of fees or costs by a person who submits an
affidavit that he “is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Plaintiff claims that he is unemployed and relies on state
and federal aid for subsistence. Based on this affidavit, the
Court grants Plaintiff's application to proceed without
prepayment of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
when a plaintiff establishes indigence, the district court
must screen the complaint as mandated by Congress in §
1915(e)(2). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see
also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th
Cir. 1997). Specifically, the district court is obligated to
dismiss a civil complaint if it is “frivolous . . .;
[or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted." § 1915(e)(2)(B). While the Court is
mindful that a pro se litigant's complaint is
held to “less stringent standards” than a
complaint drafted by counsel, it must contain facts
sufficient to show that a redressable legal wrong has been
committed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Dismissal is
appropriate where "the claim is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory[.]" Wilson v. Yaklich,
148 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff contends that Judge Rae Lee Chabot "in her
action[s] and the words of her order, have indisputably
discriminated against me . . . . " (Compl. ¶ 7).
But even assuming this was true, judges and judicial
employees are entitled to absolute immunity on claims for
damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10, 112
S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (finding that a judge
performing judicial functions is absolutely immune from suit
seeking monetary damages even if acting erroneously,
corruptly or in excess of jurisdiction); Collyer v.
Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 221 (6th Cir.1996) (citing
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9); see also Kircher v.
City of Ypsilanti, 458 F.Supp.2d 439, 446-47
(E.D.Mich.2006) (noting that judges are entitled to absolute
judicial immunity). The Sixth Circuit has described the
immunity from suit enjoyed by judges as follows:
[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are
not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even
when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are
alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. This
immunity applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to recover for alleged deprivation of civil rights. The
Supreme Court explained: “If judges were personally
liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of
suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide
powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions
likely to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be
hard to detect or control, and it would manifestly detract
from independent and impartial adjudication . . . . Most
judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction through
ordinary mechanisms of review, which are largely free of the
harmful side-effects inevitably associated with exposing
judges to personal liability.
Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir.2001)
(internal citations omitted).
challenge to the proceedings in State court involve the
performance of judicial duties by the Judge Chabot.
See (Compl. ¶ 3) ("At the hearing, Chabot
lied against me, and accused me of not filing an answer . . .
.). Absolute judicial immunity is overcome in only two
situations: (1) when liability is based on non-judicial
actions; “i.e., actions not taken in the judge's
judicial capacity, ” and (2) when liability is based on
actions taken in the complete absence of jurisdiction.”
DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 784 (6th
Cir. 1999). Because Plaintiff does not allege facts that fall
within these two exceptions, Judge Chabot is absolutely
immune and all claims asserted against her in this matter are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), this Court hereby certifies that an appeal
may not be taken in forma pauperis because it would not be
taken in good faith. This order closes the case in its
 The Court notes that Plaintiff has a
history of filing meritless litigation against state court
judges and officials. See Constant v. Kumar,
15-11926 (Cox, J), (Dkt. 12) ("Having reviewed
Plaintiff's Complaint and Response, none of the alleged
actions by Judge Kumar fall outside of the scope of judicial
immunity."); Constant v. Schuette, 15-11928
(Murphy, J) ("This Court must dismiss this action
because Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim
against these Defendants upon which relief can be
granted."); Plaintiff is strongly advised to review Rule
11 of the Federal ...