United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION SUPPORTING ORDER GRANTING THE
GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO ADJOURN  AND ORDERING
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III United States District Judge
defendants are three brothers: Jeffrey, Carlos, and Angelo
Allen. Each is accused of committing a carjacking on May 16,
2016. Angelo Allen is also accused of discharging a firearm
during the commission of the crime. The Allens were all
arrested within four days of the alleged carjacking and have
been in pretrial custody since that time.
Court has granted the Government's motion for an
adjournment because Angelo was recently appointed a new
attorney. The Court set a new trial date for March
14, 2017 and found that the period of January 12, 2017 to
March 14, 2017 was excludable delay under the Speedy Trial
Act. Order, ECF No. 69. The Court will now justify its Order
and also set the deadlines for the Government to disclose the
names of its witnesses and its reasons for introducing 404(b)
trial date was originally set for July 26, 2016. It was
adjourned, through the parties' stipulation, to September
13, 2016. Stip. Order, ECF No. 34. An adjournment to January
10, 2017 followed, due to the pretrial motions of two of the
Defendants. ECF No. 52.
and Carlos collectively filed four motions on August 1, 2016.
The motions sought to suppress certain evidence and to compel
disclosures pursuant to Brady. The motions were
fully briefed by August 22, 2016 and the Court held a hearing
on September 12, 2016. Because the trial was set for the next
day, the Court adjourned the trial to January 10, 2017. ECF
No. 52. The Court entered an order resolving the motions on
September 27, 2016. ECF No. 47.
then filed a "Request for Appointment of Counsel"
on October 19, 2016. ECF No. 53. The Court held a hearing two
weeks later, on November 3, 2016. Not., ECF No. 54. At the
hearing, Angelo and his attorney explained that Angelo was
concerned that his attorney was not taking sufficient action
on his behalf - by not filing any prior motions as the other
Defendants had done. The attorney explained that she felt
that joining the motions was not strategically necessary.
Angelo confirmed to the Court that he was now satisfied with
his attorney's performance and was willing to continue
with her as his representative. The Court therefore found the
appointment request moot.
Angelo continued to have disagreements with his attorney, and
filed a motion for her to be withdrawn two weeks later. ECF
No. 57. The Court held another hearing on December 1, 2016
and determined that the relationship between Angelo and his
attorney was irreparably broken. The Court granted his motion
and appointed a new attorney the same day. Order, ECF No. 59.
The Court then entered an order finding as excludable delay
the period from September 13, 2016 (the old trial date) to
January 10, 2017 (the then-current trial date). ECF No. 60.
weeks after Angelo Allen was appointed new counsel, the
Government, with Angelo's concurrence, sought an
adjournment to allow for adequate trial preparation. Mot.,
ECF No. 61. When the Court learned that Jeffrey and Carlos
opposed the motion, it ordered their responses in compliance
with the time provided in Local Rule 7.1(e)(2) and set and
held a hearing on January 6, 2017 - one week after the
responses were due. Order, ECF No. 65.
Opinion Supporting Previous Order
Speedy Trial Act establishes two time periods relevant to the
case: a 70-day period and a 90-day period. Pursuant to the
Act, a criminal defendant is to be tried within 70 days from
the filing date of the indictment or from "the date the
defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court
in which such charge is pending" - whichever is later.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). If the criminal defendant is
detained pending trial, the trial must commence no later than
90 days following the beginning of his continuous detention.
18 U.S.C. § 3164(a). If the trial is not commenced
within the 90 days, the Court must review the conditions of
the defendant's release. Id. at (c).
are, however, certain periods of time that are excluded in
computing both the 70- and 90-day periods. See Id.
at § 3161(h). One such exclusion is "delay
resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the
motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other
prompt disposition of, such motion." Id. at
Speedy Trial Act further provides that reasonable periods of
delay as to one defendant apply to codefendants when the
defendants are joined for trial and no motion for severance
has been granted. Id. at § 3161(h)(6). In those
cases, one Speedy-Trial clock applies to all the defendants,
see United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 776 (6th
Cir. 2002), and the clock's computation is based on the
latest co-defendant. See United States v. Blackmon,
874 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1989). When a defendant's
not-guilty plea follows his indictment and initial
appearance, the latter of the ...