United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
K. Majzoub, U.S. Magistrate Judge
AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION, MOTION FOR STAY ; DENYING AS MOOT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ; DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ;
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' JOINT MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ;
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
J. Tarnow, Senior U.S. District Judge
Tanisha Farr and Shamayah Yasharala, as Trustee for the
Yasharala Vast Estate Aim Trust, commenced this pro
se action on May 13, 2016, seeking to enjoin a
Sheriff's Sale of property located at 15087 Sussex Street
in Detroit, Michigan. Plaintiffs' complaint centers on a
mortgage loan dated January 26, 2007 that is secured by the
Sussex Street Property [Dkt. #10-2].
papers are difficult to understand, but essentially, they
claim that Nationstar violated over 30 different laws and
regulations after it refused to accept a cashier's check
as payment in full of Plaintiff Farr's mortgage debt.
Defendants contend that this check is fake and that
Plaintiffs' arguments are grounded in frivolous theories
that have been rejected by federal courts. Plaintiffs have
filed a UCC lien against Nationstar and an equitable lien
against the Property. Plaintiff Farr also filed a Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Petition on May 13, 2016. The bankruptcy matter
was dismissed on September 22, 2016.
Court now finds the motions suitable for determination
without a hearing in accord with Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For
the reasons stated below, the Court will DENY Plaintiffs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion to Stay ; DENY
AS MOOT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ; DENY
Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment ; DENY
Plaintiffs' Joint Motion for Judgment ; and GRANT
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss .
January 26, 2007, Plaintiff Tanisha Farr and her husband
(non-party Valerion Farr) took out a mortgage loan
(consisting of an executed promissory note and mortgage) for
$86, 200 plus interest from the lender, Indigo Financial.
[Dkt. 10-2, Pg. ID 115]. The mortgage is secured by the
property and was recorded in the Wayne County Register of
Deeds on February 7, 2007. Defendant Nationstar Mortgage,
LLC, began servicing the loan on April 1, 2013. Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”),
as nominee for Indigo Financial, assigned the Mortgage Loan
to Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, on May 10,
Warranty Deed was made and entered into on February 10, 2013
by the Plaintiffs [Dkt. #11-5]. This deed states that Ms.
Farr conveyed the property at 15087 Sussex Street to Vast
Estate Aim Trust for a nominal amount. Shamayah Yasharala is
the Trustee of the Vast Estate Aim Trust. In July 2016, Ms.
Farr completed a Property Transfer Affidavit [Dkt. #18-1, Pg.
ID 331], which indicates that the property at 15087 Sussex
Street was transferred to Yasharala Vast Estate Aim Trust.
Farr defaulted on her mortgage obligations and Nationstar
proceeded to file a foreclosure sale by advertisement. Though
Nationstar offered Ms. Farr a Loan Modification Agreement
[Dkt. 29-5, Pg. ID 819], which was approved and became
effective on May 28, 2014, Ms. Farr was unable to maintain
her mortgage payments. Nationstar re-initiated the
foreclosure process through a Fair Debt Collections Practices
Act letter and Foreclosure Notice dated May 16, 2016 [No.
16-13206, Dkt. #4-6]. The foreclosure sale was set for 11 AM
on June 16, 2016, but was postponed when Plaintiff filed a
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition on June 13,
filed their pro se Complaint  and a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction  on May 13, 2016. On June 6, 2016, Defendant
filed a Motion to Dismiss  and a Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction . On
June 23, 2016, the Court scheduled a hearing on the pending
motions for July 14, 2016. On July 2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed
a Motion for Summary Judgment  that also served as their
response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court
cancelled the hearing to provide Defendant time to file a
Reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss and/or a Response
in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendant filed a Reply regarding its Motion to Dismiss 
on July 19, 2016 and a Response to Plaintiffs' Summary
Judgment Motion  on August 26, 2016. Plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Judgment  on September 20, 2016, and a Motion
to Consolidate  and a Statement of Rebuttal to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss  on September 26, 2016.
August 9, 2016, Plaintiff Farr filed a complaint and
requested a preliminary injunction to stay the foreclosure
proceedings for the Sussex Street property in the Third
Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan in Wayne County. On
September 6, 2016, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal,
seeking to remove the case from Wayne County Circuit Court to
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division [No. 16-13206, Dkt. 1]. Case
number 16-13206 was listed as a companion case to the current
matter, and was reassigned from Judge Roberts to Judge Tarnow
on September 14, 2016. [16-13206, Dkt. 6]. In an Order [Dkt.
27] issued on October 18, 2016, the Court consolidated both
actions. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 29] on
October 25, 2016. Plaintiffs have not filed a Response to
Defendant's Motion as required by Rule
moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
survive such a motion, Plaintiff's complaint must plead
factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The Court must accept the complaint's factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiffs' favor. Ohio Police & Fire Pension
Fund v. Standard & Poor's Fin. Servs. LLC, 700
F.3d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 2012). “A plaintiff's
complaint must provide ‘more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Courts are not required to accept as
true legal conclusions framed as factual allegations. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations
in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
Id. (internal citations omitted). “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-'that the
pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
evaluating the sufficiency of Defendant's motion, the
court “may consider the complaint along with any
document not formally incorporated by reference or attached
to the complaint as part of the pleadings if the
‘document is referred to in the complaint and is
central to the plaintiff's claim.'” Gardner
v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 567 Fed.Appx. 362, 364-65 (6th
Cir. 2014) (quoting Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of
Va., 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999)). Such documents
include public records that are not attached to the
pleadings. Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327,
332 (6th Cir. 2008).
Court also recognizes that pro se plaintiffs are
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. However, “courts should not have to
guess at the nature of the claim asserted.”
Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App'x 975,
976-77 (6th Cir. 2012). The Court may dismiss a pleading if
it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972).
allegations are numerous and confusing. Their claims against
Nationstar seem to boil down as follows:
1) Violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1635; 2) Breach of agreement;
3) Violation of CFR § 617.7010; 4) Violation of M.C.L.
700 Estates and Protected Individuals Code;
5) Violation of M.C.L. 565.37 Alienation by Deed and the
Proof and Recording of Conveyance and the Cancelling of
6) Violation of 12 C.F.R. 1026.39(a)(1);
7) Violations of Regulations X and Z; 8) Violations of 1963
§3 of the Michigan Constitution; 9) Violations of the
National Home Owners Bill of Rights Act; 10)Violations of 26
U.S.C. § 25(c)
11) Violations of 12 U.S.C. Chapter 2
12) Violations of 28 U.S.C. § 2675, 2672; and
13) Violations of 28 CFR § 14 under the Federal Tort
Court notes that many of Plaintiffs' claims mirror those
set forth by the plaintiff in Muhammad v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., No. 16-11073, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130948
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2016) (Roberts, J.).
basis for many of Plaintiffs' allegations is that
Plaintiffs satisfied Ms. Farr's mortgage debt when they
tendered a cashier's check to Nationstar for $90, 000.00.
Nationstar states that checks like this have previously been
referred to as international promissory notes