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Horton v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

February 8, 2017

RICHARD HORTON, JR., Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

          OPINION

          ELLEN S. CARMODY United States Magistrate Judge

         This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. (ECF No. 11). Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.

         STANDARDOFREVIEW

         The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

         Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.

         PROCEDURALPOSTURE

         Plaintiff was 37 years of age on his alleged disability onset date. (PageID.235). He possesses an eleventh grade education and previously worked as an assembler and sales clerk. (PageID.50-51, 96). Plaintiff applied for benefits on May 9, 2012, alleging that he had been disabled since April 9, 2012, due to severe headaches, balance issues, memory lapse, and post-concussion syndrome. (PageID.235-36, 275). Plaintiff's application was denied, after which time he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.129).

         Following a March 28, 2013 hearing, ALJ Dawn Groenberg denied Plaintiff's claim for benefits. (PageID.58-91, 129-40). The Appeals Council subsequently remanded the matter for further consideration. (PageID.146-48). On December 10, 2014, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Manh Nguyen with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (PageID.92-112). By the time of this second administrative hearing, Plaintiff had returned to full-time work. (PageID.41). Thus, the question before ALJ Nguyen was simply whether Plaintiff was disabled between the dates of April 9, 2012, through October 1, 2013. (PageID.39). In a written decision dated February 13, 2015, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not qualify for benefits. (PageID.38-52). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.28-31). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.

         ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ'S DECISION

         The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).[1] If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

         The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).

         The ALJ determined that during the relevant time period Plaintiff suffered from: (1) degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine; (2) cephalgia; (3) obesity; (4) carpal tunnel syndrome; (5) blurred vision, amnesia, and auditory hallucination secondary to post-concussion syndrome; (6) schizoaffective disorder; (7) anxiety disorder; and (8) attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.41-44).

         With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that between the dates of April 9, 2012, through October 1, 2013, Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform light work subject to the following limitations: (1) he can occasionally lift/carry 20 pounds and can frequently lift/carry 10 pounds; (2) during an 8-hour workday he can sit and stand/walk for 6 hours each; (3) he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (4) he can occasionally balance, stoop, and crouch, but cannot kneel or crawl; (5) he can only work on level even flooring; (6) he can frequently reach, handle, and finger; (7) for every 30 minutes of sitting, standing, or walking, he must be able to change position for 5 minutes before resuming the prior position; (8) he will remain on task 90 percent of the workday; (9) he can tolerate occasional exposure to environmental pollutants such as fumes, dust, or smoke, but cannot tolerate exposure to extreme heat or cold; (10) he cannot work around unprotected heights or uncovered unguarded moving machinery; (11) he is limited to simple instructions; (12) he can tolerate occasional changes in the workplace; (13) he cannot interact with the general public as part of his job duties; and (14) he can occasionally interact with supervisors and co-workers. (PageID.44).

         The ALJ found that Plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, his limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, “a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs” is needed to meet the burden. O'Banner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). This standard requires more than mere intuition or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question ...


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