United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
T. Neff United States District Judge
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff
' s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept
Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed on
grounds of immunity and failure to state a claim.
Saabir Abdullah presently is detained at the Kent County
Correctional Facility. Plaintiff sues Kent County Circuit
Judge George Jay Quist; the Kent County Courthouse; the Kent
County Sheriff's Department; the Kent County Correctional
Facility (KCCF); and the State of Michigan.
alleges that he was arrested and brought before Defendant
Quist in Kent County Circuit Court on December 1, 2016. He
allegedly demanded an “Avernment [sic] of Jurisdiction,
” which was denied. His case was adjourned on that
date, and Plaintiff was bound over for jury trial. At the end
of the court session, Judge Quist ordered that Plaintiff be
taken to jail if he did not provide the Kent County deputies
a urine sample. Plaintiff indicated that, despite the fact
that the deputies had no warrant, he would provide a urine
sample. Upon testing, the urine sample was positive for
marijuana. Plaintiff's bond therefore was revoked and he
has since been held at KCCF.
complains that he has written to the Sheriff and
undersheriffs, the Michigan Attorney General William
Schuette, former Kent County Prosecutor William Forsyth, and
KCCF about being held in custody for a bond violation. He has
received no relief from any addressee.
relief, Plaintiff seeks the recusal of Defendant Quist in the
criminal case. He also seeks substantial compensatory and
punitive damages. In addition, in the affidavit attached to
his complaint, Plaintiff seeks release from KCCF.
appears to claim that Judge Quist violated his due process
rights when he ordered Plaintiff to submit to a urine test on
threat of being jailed on a bond violation. Generally, a
judge is absolutely immune from a suit for monetary damages.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)
(“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance
to the proper administration of justice that a judicial
officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be
free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of
personal consequences to himself.”) (internal
quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d
246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Winchell, 105
F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial immunity
may be overcome in only two instances. First, a judge is not
immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions
not taken in the judge's judicial capacity.
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (noting that immunity is
grounded in “the nature of the function performed, not
the identity of the actor who performed it”). Second, a
judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature,
taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id.
allegations clearly fail to implicate either of the
exceptions to judicial immunity. There is no doubt that
ordering Plaintiff to submit a urine sample and revoking
Plaintiff's bond were judicial acts and that Judge Quist
was acting within his jurisdiction in taking those actions.
Accordingly, Judge Quist is absolutely immune from liability.
Because Judge Quist is clearly immune from liability in this
case, Plaintiff may not maintain an action for monetary
damages against him. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
injunctive relief is also not available under § 1983,
because, under the 1996 amendments to that statute,
injunctive relief “shall not be granted” in an
action against “a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . .
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
accord Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th Cir.
2012). Plaintiff does not allege that a declaratory decree
was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.
Consequently, his ...