United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
JODY K. MOSLEY, Plaintiff,
CHRIS BLOOD, Defendant.
J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Jody K. Mosley, proceeding pro se, has filed a one-page
complaint against Chris Blood, who apparently is a supervisor
for protective services under the Friend of the Court for
Ingham County Circuit Court, which alleges:
Mr. Chris Blood, protective service has violated my rights,
he got rid of files contanting [sic] the creditbillity [sic]
of baby mom, violating my rights plus removing case
form's [sic] about my baby mother[, ] Detrisus L.
Goldman, making me lose custody but most of all my rights to
be a father to my kids, they violated my right and false
railroaded me under Judge R. Garcia. Now my kids are not even
(ECF No. 1.) The only relief Mosley requests is
“criminal charges.” (Id.)
January 24, 2017, the magistrate judge issued an order
granting Mosley leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF No. 4.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the
Court is required to dismiss any action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2); see also Benson v. O'Brian,
179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"§ 1915(e)(2) applies only to in forma
pauperis proceedings"). The Court must read
Podewell's pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596
(1972), and accept his allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).
reasons set forth below, Mosley fails to state a claim and
his complaint must be dismissed as required by §
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if
“‘it fails to give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). A court
must determine whether the complaint contains “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Although
the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“‘probability requirement, ' . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not
‘show[n]' - that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
fails to allege sufficient facts giving rise to a claim under
federal law. He refers to violation of his rights, but fails
to state what rights were violated or cite the law under
which such rights arise. “Although pro se pleadings are
to be liberally construed, courts are not required to conjure
up unpleaded allegations or guess at the nature of an
argument.” Brown v. Cracker Barrel Rest., 22
F. App'x 577, 578 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). In addition,
it appears that Mosley is complaining about harm from a
state-court judgment. If so, his complaint is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine has its roots in the Supreme
Court's decisions in District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983),
and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44
S.Ct. 149 (1923), and provides that lower federal courts are
without authority to review final judgments of state courts
in judicial proceedings. This is because “only the
Supreme Court of the United States has the jurisdiction to
review state court decisions.” Coleman v. Governor
of Mich., 413 F. App'x 866, 870 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. at 150));
see also Givens v. Homecomings Fin., 278 F.
App'x 607, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has
clarified the scope of the doctrine, confining it to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005). In light of
Exxon Mobile, the Sixth Circuit
“distinguishe[s] between plaintiffs who bring an
impermissible attack on a state court judgment-situations in
which Rooker-Feldman applies-and plaintiffs
who assert independent claims before the district
court-situations in which Rooker-Feldman
does not apply.” Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty.
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 606 F.3d 301,
309 (6th Cir. 2010). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine appears to bar Mosley's claim because he
complains about injury caused by a state-court judgment-on
that caused him to lose custody of his children.
Mosley may not use this civil proceeding to bring criminal
charges and, in fact, “[i]n his capacity as a private
citizen, [Mosley] lacks standing and legal authority to
initiate or compel the initiation of federal criminal
proceedings against defendant [Monski].” Theriot v.
Woods, No. 2:09-cv-199, 2010 WL 623684, at *13 (W.D.
Mich. Fe b. 18, 2010).
Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
 This is one of nine cases that Mosley
filed in this Court in January of 2017. The Court previously
dismissed Case Nos. 1:17-CV-7, 9, 10, 11, and 13 ...