United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Elizabeth A. Stafford United States Magistrate Judge.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
D. Borman United States District Judge.
action, Plaintiff Jason Duby alleges that Defendants Shirley
May's Place, LLC and Denise A. Walsh willfully failed and
refused to pay Plaintiff minimum wages as required by the
Federal Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 206, and Michigan's Workforce Opportunity Wage Act
(“MWOWA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 408.413.
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants knowingly and
willfully failed to compensate Plaintiff at a rate not less
than one and one-half times Plaintiff's regular rate for
work weeks longer than forty hours, as required by FLSA and
MWOWA. See 29 U.S.C. § 207; Mich. Comp. Laws
before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed
on May 23, 2016. (ECF No. 8, Defs.' Mot.) Plaintiff filed
a timely Response on June 13, 2016 (ECF No. 10, Pl.'s
Resp.), and Defendants did not file a reply. This Court held
a hearing on the Motion on September 16, 2016. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants'
motion to dismiss.
alleges that he is Defendants' former employee, and that
he worked as a clerk at Defendants' party store, Shirley
May's Place (“SMP”). (Am. Compl. at
¶¶ 3, 4, 12-13.) Defendant Denise Walsh was the
sole owner and resident agent of Defendant Shirley May's
Place, LLC and had control over its day-to-day operations.
(Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.)
was employed by Defendants from approximately May 21, 2014 to
approximately March 26, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 13.)
Plaintiff typically worked from 5:00 a.m. to 10:30 p.m.
Mondays through Thursdays; 5:00 a.m. to 11:30 p.m. on Fridays
and Saturdays; and 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays.
(Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also received
occasional days off for vacation and holidays. (Id.)
alleges that Defendants never paid him wages (standard or
overtime) for the hours he worked. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 15.)
Defendants also did not provide Plaintiff with a statement of
the hours he worked, the wages he was paid, or any deductions
taken. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges on
information and belief that Defendants also never provided
this information to state or federal agencies. (Id.)
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits dismissal of an action where the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a
court must “construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true,
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” DirectTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d
471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). To state a claim, a complaint must
provide a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he complaint ‘does not
need detailed factual allegations' but should identify
‘more than labels and conclusions.'”
Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 695 F.3d 428, 435
(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The court
“need not accept as true legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences.” Treesh, 487
F.3d at 476 (quoting Gregory v. Shelby County, 220
F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000)). “[L]egal conclusions
masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.”
Eidson v. State of Term. Dep't of Children's
Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).
plaintiff must provide more than “formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action . . . Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit
has recently reiterated that “[t]o survive a motion to
dismiss, a litigant must allege enough facts to make it
plausible that the defendant bears legal liability. The facts
cannot make it merely possible that the defendant is liable;
they must make it plausible.” Agema v. City of
Allegan, 826 F.3d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
alternatively style their Motion as a motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. To this end, Defendants
attached an exhibit to the Motion that includes a sworn
declaration of Defendant Denise Walsh as well as Defendant
Shirley May's Place, LLC's financial statements.
(Def.'s Mot., Ex. A.) These constitute matters outside
the pleadings because they are not mentioned in or central to
Plaintiff's complaint, and are also not a matter of
public record. See Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008);
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Accordingly, if the Court were to rely
upon Defendants' exhibit, the present Motion would be
converted to a motion for summary judgment and evaluated
under Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). In his
Response, Plaintiff did not rely upon Defendants' exhibit
and treated Defendants' Motion only as a motion to
dismiss. Given the procedural posture of this case, and the
fact that Defendants have attached a declaration that merely
serves to dispute factual allegations in the complaint, the
Court does not rely upon Defendants' exhibit, and instead
evaluates Defendants' Motion solely under Rule 12(b)(6).