United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
JULIAN R. HOOD, JR., Plaintiff,
MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Postmaster, United States Postal Service, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION REGARDING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT, FRAUD ON THE COURT, AND INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC
J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Julian R. Hood, Jr., has filed numerous lawsuits in this
district and other federal courts alleging claims arising out
of his employment with the United States Postal Service
(USPS). Hood's employment with the USPS terminated in
April of 2004. Hood filed an Equal Employment Opportunity
complaint of discrimination with the USPS, and in November
2005 Hood settled his claims pursuant to a settlement
commenced his onslaught of litigation in this district in
2014, and six of his cases, Nos. 1:14-CV-1104, 1180, 1181-83,
and 1195, were assigned to the undersigned district judge. On
July 10, 2015, the Court entered an Opinion and a separate
Order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss and
dismissing all of the 2014 cases. On July 18, 2015, the Court
denied Hood's motions for reconsideration in the 2014
cases. Hood appealed Case No. 1:14-CV-1104 to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed
this Court's order dismissing Hood's complaint in an
order entered on February 3, 2017. Hood v. Brennan,
No. 15-1937, unpublished order (6th Cir. Feb. 3,
2015, Hood filed three more cases, Nos. 1:15-CV-434-36. In
May of 2015, this Court screened Hood's complaints
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed them as
time-barred. Hood appealed all three cases to the Sixth
Circuit, which reversed the dismissals on the ground that
this Court failed to afford Hood an opportunity to argue
equitable tolling. Following remand, this Court again
screened and dismissed Hood's complaints, concluding that
Hood was not entitled to equitable tolling and that
Hood's claims were barred by the doctrine of claim
preclusion. Hood appealed all three cases, which remain
pending before the Sixth Circuit.
on June 2, 2016, the District of Columbia transferred one of
Hood's cases to this district, which was assigned to the
undersigned district judge as Case No. 1:16-CV-665. On
December 19, 2016, this Court entered an Opinion and Order
dismissing Hood's complaint as barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion. Hood appealed the dismissal to the Sixth
Circuit, and that appeal remains pending.
has now filed in each of the above-mentioned cases a motion
for relief from judgment asserting fraud on the court and
intrinsic and extrinsic fraud. His motion is without merit and
will be denied.
the Court notes that it may consider Hood's motion as to
all cases, including those currently on appeal before the
Sixth Circuit. Although a district court generally lacks
jurisdiction over a case on appeal, see Post v.
Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that
an appeal deprives a district court of jurisdiction to decide
a Rule 60(b) motion), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1,
adopted in 2009, addresses the instant situation. Rule 62.1
(a) Relief Pending Appeal. If a timely motion is made for
relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an
appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may:
(1) defer considering the motion;
(2) deny the motion; or
(3) state either that it would grant the motion if the court
of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises
a substantial issue.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(a). Pursuant to the rule, the Court will
deny the motions.
states that he brings his motions pursuant to Rules 60(b) and
60(d). Rule 60(b) provides that the court may relieve a party
. . . from a final judgment, ...