United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
KEN McKEE, et al., Defendants.
L. MALONEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a civil rights action brought by a pro se state
prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is an inmate
at the Oaks Correctional Facility. This lawsuit arises out of
conditions of his confinement on December 28, 2013, at the
Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC). Plaintiff named
two employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) as defendants: Warden Kenneth McKee and Resident Unit
Manager (RUM) Robert Mote. Plaintiff alleges that on December
28, 2013, defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
deliberate indifference to the risk that plaintiff would be
assaulted by another inmate. Plaintiff asks the Court, in its
discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
negligence claims against defendants under state law.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and an award of damages
against defendants in their individual capacities.
matter is before the Court on defendants' motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff opposes the motion.
(ECF No. 21). For the reasons set forth herein,
defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted
and judgment will be entered in defendants' favor on all
plaintiff's federal claims. The Court, in its discretion,
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff's purported state law claims.
judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there
are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); McKay v. Federspiel, 823 F.3d
862, 866 (6th Cir. 2016). The standard for determining
whether summary judgment is appropriate is “whether
‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.' ”
Rocheleau v. Elder Living Const., LLC, 814 F.3d 398,
400 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The Court must
consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and
admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in
favor of the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986); France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 624 (6th
the party without the burden of proof seeks summary judgment,
that party bears the initial burden of pointing out to the
district court an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party's case, but need not support its motion
with affidavits or other materials “negating” the
opponent's claim. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal
Court, 201 F.3d 784, 787 (6th Cir. 2000); see also
Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir.
2005). Once the movant shows that “there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case,
” the nonmoving party has the burden of coming forward
with evidence raising a triable issue of fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To sustain
this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere
allegations of his pleadings. See Ellington v. City of E.
Cleveland, 689 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2012); see
also Scadden v. Warner, No. 16-1876, ___ F. App'x
___, 2017 WL 384874, at * 4 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2017). The
motion for summary judgment forces the nonmoving party to
present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact
for trial. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886
F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1990); see Newell Rubbermaid,
Inc. v. Raymond Corp., 676 F.3d 521, 533 (6th Cir.
2012). “A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient;
‘there must be evidence on which a jury could
reasonably find for the [non-movant].' ”
Dominguez v. Correctional Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543,
549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
252); see Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep't,
844 F.3d 556, 565 (6th Cir. 2016).
following facts are beyond genuine issue. Plaintiff is an
inmate held in the custody of the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) on criminal convictions. The defendants
are employed by the MDOC at the Bellamy Creek Correctional
Facility (IBC). Kenneth McKee is the warden. (McKee Aff.
¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 17-4, PageID.113). Robert Mote is a
Resident Unit Manager (RUM). (Mote Aff. ¶ 1-2, ECF No.
September 30, 2013, plaintiff was charged with misconduct for
fighting with prisoner Jones. (ECF No. 17-2, PageID.84). On
October 9, 2013, a hearing officer conducted a hearing on
this misconduct charge. Plaintiff denied that there had been
any fight. He characterized it as mere
“horseplay.” Prisoner Jones, the other
participant, said that it was a fight. The hearing officer
found plaintiff guilty of the misconduct of fighting and
sentenced plaintiff to 15 days of detention. (ECF No. 17-2,
PageID.83; ECF No. 21-1, PageID.138-39). In October Prisoner
Jones was transferred to another prison. (Mote Aff. ¶ 6,
ECF No. 17-2, PageID.65).
to Policy Directive 04.05.120 and as a result of his
misconduct conviction, IBC's Security Classification
Committee (SCC) placed plaintiff in administrative
segregation. The SCC conducted periodic reviews of
plaintiff's status. (ECF No. 17-2, PageID.68-81, 85-91).
December 11, 2013, plaintiff filed a grievance in which he
disavowed all his earlier statements claiming that his
interaction with prisoner Jones on September 30, 2013, had
been mere horseplay. Now plaintiff claimed that prisoner
Jones was a “gangster” and that plaintiff had
received “numerous death threats by gangbangers.”
(ECF No. 17-2, PageID.93). RUM Mote provided the Step I
response to this grievance. Mote noted that plaintiff's
allegations had been investigated and it was determined that
there was no credible, verifiable evidence supporting
plaintiff's allegations. (ECF No. 17-2, PageID.94; Mote
Aff. ¶¶ 11-12, PageID.65).
received no misconducts while he was held in administrative
segregation. Therefore, he was eligible to return to the
prison's general population. (Mote Aff. ¶ 13, ECF
No. 17-2, PageID.65). During the December 27, 2013, SCC
review, RUM Mote asked plaintiff if he was willing to return
to IBC's general population. Plaintiff responded that he
was willing to reenter the prison's general population.
At no time during the SCC review did plaintiff make a
protection request. (Mote Aff. ¶ 14, ECF No. 17-2,
PageID.65). On December 28, 2013, the SCC released plaintiff
back into IBC's general population. (ECF No. 17-2,
PageID.91; Mote Aff. ¶ 16, ECF No. 17-2, PageID.66).
McKee and RUM Mote did not have any reason to believe that
plaintiff was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm.
(McKee Aff. ¶¶ 7-10, ECF No. 17-4, ...