United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Stephanie Dawkins Davis, U.S. Magistrate Judge
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ,
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ,
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ,
OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION 
J. Tarnow, Senior U.S. District Judge
February 16, 2017, Magistrate Judge Davis issued a Report and
Recommendation (R&R) , recommending that
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment  be granted
and, accordingly, that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment  be denied. Plaintiff filed an objection  on
March 2, 2017, and Defendant filed a response  on March
13, 2017. For the reasons stated below, the R&R  is
ADOPTED and is entered as the findings and conclusions of the
Court, and Plaintiff's objection  is OVERRULED.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment  is GRANTED
and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment  is
filed a claim seeking disability benefits on December 10,
2013, alleging that he became disabled and unable to work,
commencing September 1, 2012. His claims were denied,
initially on April 2, 2014. Plaintiff subsequently had an
administrative hearing on December 10, 2014, and a decision
was issued on January 27, 2015, determining that Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Magistrate Judge summarized the administrative record of
Plaintiff's disability application as follows:
Plaintiff was 50 years old on the alleged disability date.
(Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 61). Plaintiff, a resident of Detroit,
Michigan, has a high school education and past relevant work
as a material handler, forklift driver and production machine
tender, which are classified as medium or heavy and skilled.
Id. Plaintiff testified that he could not work
because of fatigue, limited lifting and walking ability,
leftsided weakness, and difficulty with his memory and
completing tasks. (Dkt. 12-2, Pg ID 59, 83-84).
The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis to
plaintiff's claims and found at step one that plaintiff
did not engage in any substantial gainful activity since the
application date. Id. at 56. At step two, the ALJ
found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
status-post cerebrovascular accident, status-post myocardial
infarction, hypertension, and adjustment disorder.
Id. At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met
or equaled one of the listings in the regulations.
Id. at 57. The ALJ determined the following as to
plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC):
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual
functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: the claimant could
occasionally kneel, crouch, crawl, climb ramps, stairs,
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He could frequently balance
and stoop. He should avoid hazardous machinery and heights.
He would be limited to simple routine tasks.
Id. at 58. At step four, the ALJ determined that
plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work.
Id. at 61. At step five, the ALJ concluded that
based on plaintiffs age, education, work experience and RFC,
there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that plaintiff could have performed and,
therefore, he was not under a disability from the date of the
application through the date of the decision. Id. at
[18 at 2-4].
Court reviews objections to an R&R on a dispositive
motion de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c).
Judicial review of a decision by an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) is limited to determining whether the
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and
whether the ALJ employed the proper legal standards.
Richardson v. Perales,402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The
ALJ's factual findings “are conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence.” Maziarz v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs.,837 F.2d 240, 243 (6th Cir.
1987). “Substantial evidence is defined as more than a
scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec,486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir.
2007). The substantial evidence standard “does not
permit a selective reading of the record, ” as ...