United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Anthony P. Patti Mag. Judge
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
E. LEVY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
February 1, 2017, the Court granted the above-named
defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 50.) On
March 24, 2017, pro se plaintiff Eric Santifer filed
a letter with the Court, arguing he “did not receive
competent legal representation in this matter, ” and
refiling the objections he filed in response to the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which
recommended granting the motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff has also requested a record of the initial
scheduling hearing and a copy of defendants' deposition.
Court will treat plaintiff's letter and refiled
objections as a motion for reconsideration. For the reasons
set forth below, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
April 24, 2015, plaintiff filed this lawsuit against
defendants, arguing they wrongfully terminated him on the
basis of race. The facts of this case have been set forth in
detail in the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 47), and will
be incorporated by reference here. On February 1, 2017, the
Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on
the ground that plaintiff's claim was time-barred. (Dkt.
50.) Specifically, the Court held that plaintiff received
notice from the EEOC that it had completed its investigation
of his administrative action, and would be mailing his right
to sue (“RTS”) notice on January 15, 2015.
(Id. at 4.) Therefore, because plaintiff knew the
letter would be mailed that day, the ninety-day statute of
limitations began to run on January 20, 2015 under the
five-day mail rule, and plaintiff had until April 20, 2015,
to file a complaint in federal court. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff did not file the complaint until April 24, 2015,
four days after the statute of limitations expired, and
defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment.
(Id. at 6-7.)
motion for reconsideration should be granted “if the
movant demonstrates a palpable defect by which the court and
the parties have been misled and that a different disposition
of the case must result from a correction thereof.”
In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 728 F.3d 567, 573- 74
(6th Cir. 2013). “A palpable defect is one that is
‘obvious, clear, unmistakable, manifest, or
plain.'” Majchrzak v. Cty. of Wayne, 838
F.Supp.2d 586, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
argues the Court erred in granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment for the same reasons as set forth in the
objections to the Report and Recommendation. He also argues
that he lacked sufficient legal counsel, and therefore the
five-day mail rule should not apply to him.
the Court considered plaintiff's refiled objections in
its original order denying the objections and granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has
presented no new arguments to support the objections. Thus,
there is no palpable defect in the Court's prior opinion
and order, and the Court denies plaintiff's motion on
these grounds. See L.R. 7.1(h)(3) (“the court
will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that
merely present the same issues ruled upon by the
asserts he lacked competent legal representation in this
matter, and the five-day mail rule therefore should not apply
to him. As the Court stated in its prior opinion and order:
rule may seem harsh, but the Sixth Circuit is clear that
“notice is given and hence the ninety-day
limitations term begins running, on the fifth day following
the EEOC's mailing of an RTS notification . . . by virtue
of a presumption of actual delivery and receipt within that
five-day duration, unless the plaintiff rebuts that
presumption with proof that he or she did not
receive notification within that period.”
Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 557 (emphasis in
original). And this Court cannot alter this ...