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Myland v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

March 30, 2017

JOHN M. MYLAND, Plaintiff,


          RAY KENT United States Magistrate Judge.

         Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying his claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB).

         Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of April 17, 2012. PageID.216. Plaintiff identified his disabling conditions as: chronic pain; mood disorder; depression; post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); anxiety; chronic right elbow pain; chronic back pain; chronic headaches; and prinzmetal angina. PageID.220. He completed a GED and had past employment as a delivery manager for a furniture leasing business, truck driver, and a security specialist at a hospital. PageID.84-85, 221. The administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed plaintiff's claim de novo and entered a written decision denying benefits on July 18, 2014. PageID.48-62. This decision, which was later approved by the Appeals Council, has become the final decision of the Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.


         This court's review of the Commissioner's decision is typically focused on determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). A determination of substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 925 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).

         The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. This Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that the record also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in the record. Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the reviewing court would resolve the dispute differently, the Commissioner's decision must stand if it is supported by substantial evidence. Young, 925 F.2d at 147.

         A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to benefits. A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step analysis:

The Social Security Act requires the Secretary to follow a “five-step sequential process” for claims of disability. First, plaintiff must demonstrate that she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity” at the time she seeks disability benefits. Second, plaintiff must show that she suffers from a “severe impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability. A “severe impairment” is one which “significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Third, if plaintiff is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment meets a listed impairment, plaintiff is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education or work experience. Fourth, if the plaintiff's impairment does not prevent her from doing her past relevant work, plaintiff is not disabled. For the fifth and final step, even if the plaintiff's impairment does prevent her from doing her past relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, plaintiff is not disabled.

Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

         The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work through step four. Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). However, at step five of the inquiry, “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant's residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile.” Id. If it is determined that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).


         Plaintiff's claim failed at the fifth step of the evaluation. At the first step, the ALJ found that plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity during a portion of the relevant time period (from his alleged onset date in April 2012 through November 2012). PageID.50. However, the ALJ also found that despite having engaged in substantial gainful employment for several months after the alleged onset date, there has been a continuous 12-month period during which plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity, and that he met the insured status of the Social Security Act (“Act”) through December 31, 2017. Id. At the second step, the ALJ found that plaintiff had severe impairments of degenerative disc disease lumbar spine; history of remote in time T11 compression fracture (thoracic spine); dysthymic disorder; anxiety disorder; PTSD; pain disorder; and narcotic dependence. PageID.51. At the third step, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Id.

         The ALJ decided at the fourth step that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform “to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except occasional climbing and occasional balancing; can perform simple, repetitive work with occasional public contact and no fast-paced work.” PageID.53. The ALJ also found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. PageID.60.

         At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could perform a significant number of unskilled, medium exertional jobs in the national economy. PageID.61. Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform the following unskilled work in the region (defined as the State of Michigan): laborer (medium) (17, 000 jobs); custodial (medium) (38, 000 jobs); and custodial (light) (13, 000 jobs). Id. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from April 17, 2012 (the alleged onset date) through July 18, 2014 (the decision date). Id.


         Plaintiff raised three issues on appeal:

         A. Did the Commissioner violate the regulationsrequiring controlling weight for treating ...

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