In re TAYLOR ANNE KILLICH.
TAYLOR ANNE KILLICH, Respondent-Appellant. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Petitioner-Appellee,
Circuit Court LC No. 14-000567-DL
Before: M.J. Kelly, P.J., and Stephens and O'Brien, JJ.
minor Taylor Anne Killich, appeals as of right the trial
court order dismissing a petition against her for poisoning
food, drink, medicine, or water supply, MCL 750.436(2)(a), an
offense punishable by imprisonment for fifteen years, a fine
of $10, 000, or both, and denying her motion to waive a
previously ordered $100 probation supervision fee. We vacate
filed a delinquency proceedings petition against respondent
for violating MCL 750.436(2)(a) after an incident on June 5,
2014. On May 6, 2015, respondent pleaded no contest before a
referee. A probationary order was prepared in which
respondent was placed on probation for a period of three
months. She was ordered to complete 20 hours of community
service by August 21, 2015, to participate in "the
Victim Awareness class, " and submit urine screens if
requested by her probation officer. Under the proposed order,
respondent's probation officer could also impose an
additional 20 hours of community service at his or her
discretion. The court denied respondent's motion to waive
a $100 probation supervision fee.
sentencing hearing before the referee, respondent's
counsel agreed that probation was an appropriate remedy, but
objected to the $100 probation supervision fee, citing
People v Juntikka, 310 Mich.App. 306; 871 N.W.2d 555
(2015). Counsel's argument was unsuccessful and he
requested a review hearing before the trial court.
September 23, 2015 review hearing, respondent's counsel
asserted that respondent completed all probation and
community service requirements, but again objected to the
$100 probation supervision fee. Respondent's counsel
argued that the court did not have statutory authority under
the Juvenile Code to impose a pre-determined flat rate fee
and that the Juvenile Code only permitted the court to be
reimbursed for individualized costs of probation supervision
services extended to individual juveniles.
argued that three statutory provisions allowed for the
imposition of a probation supervision fee: 1) MCL
712A.18');">712A.18(1)(b), 2) MCL 712A.18');">712A.18(3), and 3) MCL 712A.18');">712A.18(12).
Petitioner argued that MCL 712A.18');">712A.18(1)(b) required a juvenile
under supervision or probation to pay the minimum state costs
prescribed by statute and that as a probationer, respondent
was at least required to pay a statutory minimum of $68.
Petitioner also argued that MCL 712A.18');">712A.18(3) authorized orders
of disposition placing a juvenile in the juvenile's own
home to contain a provision for reimbursement by the juvenile
to the court for the cost of service. Lastly, petitioner
argued that MCL 712A.18');">712A.18(12) stated that if a court entered an
order of disposition for a juvenile offense, the court
"shall order" the juvenile to pay a statutory
assessment defined under MCL 780.905, which in
respondent's case was a fee of $130. Petitioner maintains
the same on appeal.
also distinguished Juntikka, arguing the probation
fee in that case was impermissible because it was used to
purchase general probation department supplies, whereas in
the present case the $100 probation supervision fee went
directly to the general Washtenaw County General Fund. The
court called Donna White, a probation supervisor in the
juvenile court who testified that the probation office
charges the same $100 probation supervision fee to all
juveniles on probation and that the funds go to the county
General Fund. The court acknowledged that the fee may go to
the general fund but affirmed its imposition stating,
So I do think, because of the mechanism of funding and the
allocation it is actually a reimbursement, whether or not the
fact it goes to the general fund, whether or not the fact it
is a flat albeit extremely minimal fee compared to the true
cost; you may be right in that legal analysis. I will leave
that to the Court of Appeals to direct us as to where we go
but at this stage the motion is denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
case involves the interpretation of multiple statutes
contained in the Juvenile Code, MCL 712A.1et seq.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review
de novo on appeal. In ...