United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
TREVIS C. JOHNSON, # 246092, Petitioner,
T. MACKIE, Respondent.
L. Maloney, United States District Judge
a habeas corpus proceeding brought pro se by a state
prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On May 15, 2012,
petitioner pleaded no contest in Muskegon County Circuit
Court to first-degree home invasion, domestic violence (third
offense), assault and battery upon Vanessa Wallace, and
assault and battery upon Lauretta Steward. He pleaded guilty
to being an habitual offender, fourth felony offense. As an
habitual offender, petitioner had faced a sentence of up to
life imprisonment on his first-degree home invasion
conviction. Under a Cobbs agreement regarding his
first-degree home invasion conviction, however, petitioner
was assured that his minimum sentence on that conviction
would be ten years' imprisonment and his maximum sentence
would be 25 years' imprisonment. On June 26, 2012,
petitioner was sentenced in accordance with the
Cobbs agreement on his first degree home invasion
conviction. Further, petitioner was sentenced to three to
fifteen years' imprisonment on his domestic violence
conviction. Petitioner received jail sentences of less than a
year, with credit for time served, on his misdemeanor assault
and battery convictions. After unsuccessful attempts to
overturn his plea-based conviction and sentence in state
court, petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition.
Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief on the
I. Petitioner was arrested without a warrant and was not read
his Miranda rights.
II. The Muskegon County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction
because petitioner did not have an arraignment hearing.
III. Petitioner's November 30, 2011, waiver of a
preliminary examination in district court was undermined by
conflicts of interest.
IV. Failure to provide petitioner with a fair trial within
180 days and denial of right to counsel of choice or
(Amended Petition, ECF No. 8, PageID.89-92).
argues that the petition is barred by the statute of
limitations and has filed a motion seeking dismissal of the
petition with prejudice on that basis. (ECF No. 16).
Petitioner has filed his response. (ECF No. 18). After review
of the state-court record, the Court finds that the petition
is barred by the statute of limitations. Respondent's
motion will be granted and judgment will be entered
dismissing the petition with prejudice.
Court's review of this petition is governed by the
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). See
Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001). AEDPA
“dictates a highly deferential standard for evaluating
state-court rulings which demands the state court decisions
be given the benefit of the doubt.” Bell v.
Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (citations omitted).
“AEDPA requires heightened respect for state court
factual and legal determinations.” Lundgren v.
Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 762 (6th Cir. 2006).
“State-court factual findings  are presumed correct;
the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption by
clear and convincing evidence.” Davis v.
Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2199-2200 (2015) (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
state court adjudicated the claim, deferential AEDPA
standards must be applied. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121 (2011); Waddington
v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009); Holder v.
Palmer, 588 F.3d 328, 341 (6th Cir. 2009) ((“[A]ny
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings' is subject to AEDPA deference.”)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). AEDPA prevents federal
habeas “retrials” and ensures that state court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under
law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002). It
prohibits “using federal habeas corpus review as a
vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state
courts.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148,
2149 (2012) (per curiam).
AEDPA standard is difficult to meet “because it was
meant to be.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 102 (2011). “Section 2254(d) reflects the that
habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the
state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary
error corrections through appeal.” Id. at
102-03 (citation and internal quotation omitted); see
Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). Section
2254(d) states that an application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to
a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see
White v. Wheeler, 136 S.Ct. 456, 460 (2015); Davis
v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. at 2198; White v. Woodall,
134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014).
only definitive source of clearly established federal law for
purposes of § 2254(d)(1) is the holdings-not dicta-of
Supreme Court decisions. White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct.
at 1702; see Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. at 1377
(“Because none of our cases confront ‘the
specific question presented by this case, ' the state
court's decision could not be ‘contrary to' any
holding from this Court.”). “[W]here the precise
contours of a right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad
discretion in their adjudication of a prisoner's
claims.” Id. (quotations and internal
unreasonable application of the Supreme Court's holding
must be “‘objectively unreasonable, ' not
merely wrong; even ‘clear error' will not
suffice.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1702
(quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76
(2003)). Rather, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas
corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that
the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1702 (quoting
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 103).
“[C]ircuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,
' ” and “[i]t therefore cannot form the basis
for habeas relief under AEDPA.” Hill v.
Curtin, 792 F.3d 670, 677 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. at 2155); see
Glebe v. Frost, 135 S.Ct. 429, 431 (2014) (per
curiam) (“As we have repeatedly emphasized, 
circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely
because the federal habeas court would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood
v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). Section 2254 (d)(2)
requires that this Court accord the state trial court
substantial deference. If reasonable minds reviewing the
record might disagree about the finding in question, on
habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial
court's determination. Brumfield v. Cain, 135
S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct.
10, 15 (2013).