United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti
AMENDED ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
REHEARING AND RECONSIDERATION, TO ALTER JUDGMENT, AND FOR
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT  
J. Tarnow, Senior United States District Judge
Nancy Gucwa and Mark Marusza filed a Motion for Rehearing and
Reconsideration, to Alter Judgment, and for Relief from
Judgment on February 6, 2017 [Dkt. #112]. Plaintiffs move the
Court for rehearing and reconsideration of its January 23,
2017 Opinion and Order Granting Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss, Denying Defendant Dr. Rubin's Motion for
Sanctions, and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
File an Amendment to the Second Amended Complaint .
Specifically, Plaintiffs ask the Court to rehear, reconsider,
and reverse its holdings as to Nancy Gucwa's RICO Claim
(Count I), Mark Marusza's Claim under the Medicare
Secondary Payer Act (“MSPA”) (Count II), and
Plaintiffs' Claims of Tortious Interference (Count III).
reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motions are
Rule 7.1(h)(3), which governs motions for reconsideration,
Generally, and without restricting the court's
discretion, the court will not grant motions for rehearing or
reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled
upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable
implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable
defect by which the court and the parties and other persons
entitled to be heard on the motion have been misled but also
show that correcting the defect will result in a different
disposition of the case.
See Hansmann v. Fid. Invs. Institutional Servs. Co.,
326 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 2003) (A motion for
reconsideration is granted only “if the movant
demonstrates that the district court and the parties have
been misled by a palpable defect, and correcting the defect
will result in a different disposition of the case”).
“A palpable defect is a defect which is obvious, clear,
unmistakable, manifest or plain.” Fleck v.
Titan Tire Corp., 177 F.Supp.2d 605, 624 (E.D. Mich.
2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “The
decision whether to grant reconsideration lies largely within
the discretion of the court.” Yuba Natural Res.,
Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
also move the Court under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
59(e) and 60(b) to alter or amend the January 23, 2017
Judgment. Rule 59(e) allows courts to alter the judgment
based on “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly
discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling
law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.”
Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th
Cir. 2005). In deciding whether to grant a Rule 59(e) motion,
courts must “consider[ ] the competing interest of
protecting the finality of judgments and the expeditious
termination of litigation.” Morse v.
McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 2002). Parties
are not permitted to use such motions to re-argue their case.
See Davison v. Roadway Express, Inc., 562 F.Supp.2d
971, 984 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (Rule 59(e) motions are not
“designed to give an unhappy litigant an opportunity to
relitigate matters already decided[.]”).
“relief under Rule 60(b) is ‘circumscribed by
public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination
of litigation.” Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of
the UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th
Cir. 2001) (quoting Waifersong Ltd., Inc. v. Classic
Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992)).
Relief under Rule 60(b) may be granted for the following
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(e); (3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on
an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any
other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “Relief under rule 60(b) is
extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional
circumstances.” Higgs v. Sanford, 2009 WL
1734467, at *1 (W.D. Ky. June 17, 2009) (internal quotations
Gucwa's RICO Claim
Plaintiff Gucwa argues that the Court erred when it dismissed
her RICO claim for lack of standing. Gucwa highlights the
fact that she filed a Form C Application for Mediation or
Hearing with the Workers' Compensation Agency,
demonstrating that she continued asserting her
“entitlement to be paid for services rendered.”
(Dkt. 112 at 12). Further, according to Plaintiffs, Gucwa
suffered an injury in that she was not compensated for the
services she rendered.
arguments are the same as those presented in response to
Defendants' motions to dismiss. “[T]he proper forum
for expressing disagreement with the Court's substantive
reasoning is an appeal on the merits, ” and the Court
declines to address Plaintiffs' “allegations of
substantive errors” in deciding the instant motion.
Doshi v. General Cable Corp., 2015 WL 2229233, at *2
n.2 (E.D. Ky. May 12, 2015). As discussed in the January 23,
2017 Opinion and Order, it would not make sense to allow
Gucwa to recover where Marusza - the injured party - cannot.
Gucwa's claimed damages are too intimately connected with
Marusza's personal injury underlying his workers'
compensation claim to constitute an injury to business or
property that is recoverable under RICO. See Lewis v.
Drouillard, 788 F.Supp.2d 567, 570 (E.D. Mich. 2011);
Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, 731
F.3d 556, 566 ...