United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
Stephanie Dawkins Davis United States Magistrate Judge
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
EX PARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
Gershwin A. Drain United States District Court Judge
mortgage foreclosure case. Plaintiff, who is a disabled,
wheelchair-bound individual, requests the Court to
temporarily restrain the Defendants from evicting her and her
family from their current home. For the reasons that will
follow, the Court will DENY Plaintiff's Motion for Ex
Parte Temporary Restraining Order .
the facts in this case remain unknown. Plaintiff, Karen
Poindexter, is physically disabled. She is diagnosed with
Sarcoidosis and Ataxia. According to her doctor, these
conditions make her unable to move from her home. Her
condition is not likely to improve. Dkt. No. 4, p. 26 (Pg. ID
40). Ms. Poindexter has resided at 13041 Oak Park Blvd. in
Oak Park, Michigan since at least 2000. Id., p. 24
(Pg. ID 38). It seems that Ms. Poindexter defaulted on her
mortgage and her home was sold via sheriff's deed, on
July 26, 2016. Id., p. 16 (Pg. ID 30). On November
11, 2016, Ms. Poindexter requested an occupied conveyance
from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(hereinafter “HUD”). Id., p. 24 (Pg. ID
are two defendants in this case: NationStar Mortgage, LLC
(hereinafter “NationStar”), the residential
mortgage servicer, and Petru Pusta. Dkt. No. 1, pp. 2- 3 (Pg.
ID 2-3). Petru Pusta purchased the property from NationStar.
Id. p. 2 (Pg. ID 2). According to a judgment entered
in Michigan's 45th District Court on June 19, 2017, Petru
Pusta “can apply for an order evicting [Ms. Poindexter]
if [Ms. Poindexter] does not move out on or before
6/29/17.” On June 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed her
Complaint. On June 29, 2017 at 3:50 p.m., Plaintiff filed an
Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
Legal Standard for Temporary Restraining Order
district court must assess four factors in deciding whether
to issue a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order: “(1) whether the plaintiff has established a
substantial likelihood or probability of success on the
merits; (2) whether there is a threat of irreparable harm to
the plaintiff; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would
cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public
interest would be served by granting injunctive
relief.” Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of
Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 888 (6th Cir. 2000).
“The four considerations applicable to preliminary
injunction decisions are factors to be balanced, not
prerequisites that must be met.” Hamad v. Woodcrest
Condo. Ass'n, 328 F.3d 224, 230 (6th Cir. 2003).
Complaint asserts two counts against the Defendants: (1)
violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”) and; (2) breach of contract. Although
there is a threat of harm to the Plaintiff, she has not
established a substantial likelihood or probability of
success on the merits of her claims.
RESPA and 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41
alleges that the Defendants violated RESPA by failing to
engage in loss mitigation efforts to avoid the foreclosure of
a HUD-insured single family residence. Dkt. No. 1, p. 3 (Pg.
ID 3). Ms. Poindexter bases this claim on 12 C.F.R. §
1024.41, “a regulation promulgated by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. ...