United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division
ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS, ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION, AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT
L. LUDINGTON United States District Judge
February 17, 2017, Plaintiff Ross Levay filed a complaint
alleging that the United States and various government
officials have committed gross negligence, breach of
contract, First Amendment violations, and breach of oath by
failing to prevent “incitement to imminent
lawlessness” by “Radical Islamic
Terrorists.” Compl. at 6-7, ECF No. 1. The case was
referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris. ECF No. 3.
On February 24, 2017, Judge Morris issued a report
recommending that the case be dismissed sua sponte because
Levay does not have standing. ECF No. 7. Levay then filed 28
pages of objections wherein he challenges virtually every
aspect of Judge Morris's report and recommendation. For
the following reasons, those objections will be overruled and
Levay's complaint will be dismissed.
complaint, Levay explains that “there have been a high
and increasing number of Islamic motivated violent acts
targeting Jews and our places of worship.” Compl. at 5,
ECF No. 1. Levay is a Jew and contends that the
“incitement to imminent violence” found in the
Quran and “cited by ISIS, Al Qaeda” and others
has deprived Levay of “the freedom of religious
provides an extensive list of requested relief. He wishes the
Court to hold that “specific Koranic verses, presented
during the trial, fail the Imminent Lawlessness Test.”
Id. at 6. He also intends to prove a “direct
link to specific Koranic verses extolling among specific
Radical Islamic Terrorists as the underlying motive, cause
and essential ‘but for' for 74 specific Radical
Islamic Terrorist attacks within the US.” Id.
He desires a “formal declaration of incompatibility
between Koranic Sharia Law . . . and U.S. Constitutional
Law.” Id. at 7. He also asks that the Court
direct Congress to take action by outlawing certain passages
of the Quran, issue a federally sanctioned and edited Koran,
and withdraw tax-exempt status from mosques which do not
adopt the new Quran, and institute a “National Islamic
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may object to
and seek review of a magistrate judge's report and
recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Objections must be stated with specificity. Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985) (citation omitted). If
objections are made, “[t]he district judge must
determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's
disposition that has been properly objected to.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3). De novo review requires at least a
review of the evidence before the magistrate judge; the Court
may not act solely on the basis of a magistrate judge's
report and recommendation. See Hill v. Duriron Co.,
656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981). After reviewing the
evidence, the Court is free to accept, reject, or modify the
findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge. See
Lardie v. Birkett, 221 F.Supp.2d 806, 807 (E.D. Mich.
those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo
review under the statute. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d
636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The parties have the duty to
pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that
the district court must specially consider.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A general objection, or one that merely restates the
arguments previously presented, does not sufficiently
identify alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge.
See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F.Supp.2d 934, 937 (E.D.
Mich. 2004). An “objection” that does nothing
more than disagree with a magistrate judge's
determination, “without explaining the source of the
error, ” is not considered a valid objection.
Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Without specific objections,
“[t]he functions of the district court are effectively
duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court
perform identical tasks. This duplication of time and effort
wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs
contrary to the purposes of the Magistrate's Act.”
than individually addressing Levay's 28 pages of
objections, his complaint will be reviewed de no. This suit
is frivolous and will be dismissed.
Levay lacks standing to bring this suit. Levay's suit
seeks relief for the threat of violence that Islamic
extremism poses to him and his community. But he does not
allege injury to him personally, or an imminent,
particularized threat of future injury. See Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (holding that
standing “requires that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured”). Even if Levay did allege
an actionable injury, the Court does not have the authority
to direct Congress to legislate on an issue, much less
vanquish the specter of religiously-motivated violence.
See Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor,
Mich., 102 F.3d 781, 797 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that federal courts do not have the power to order Congress
to enact legislation). And, more fundamentally, Levay's
requests for a state-issued Koran, a national registry of
Muslims, and financial sanctions for rogue mosques offend
basic constitutional principles. The First Amendment forbids
Congress from making a law “respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
U.S. Const., Am. I.
does not have standing to bring suit and requests remedies
which violate the Constitution. Accordingly, his objections
will be overruled, Judge Morris's report and
recommendation will be adopted, and his complaint will be sua
it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Levay's objections, ECF ...