United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
VICTORIA A. ROBERTS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10, 2017, Plaintiff Kirk Leaphart filed a pro se
civil rights complaint against Rick Snyder and the City of
Detroit, alleging a violation of his procedural due process
rights. Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in
application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
However, his complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a
claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court has
an obligation to screen the complaint and dismiss the case if
it: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state
a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint set
forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of
this rule is to “give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Although this standard
“does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,
' . . . it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further
factual enhancement.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
Court construes a pro se plaintiff's complaint
liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). However, that “leniency . . . is not boundless,
” and “basic pleading standards” still must
be satisfied. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714
(6th Cir. 2004).
complaint is five sentences in length. Plaintiff alleges that
on June 25, 2017 Detroit Police Officers arrested him without
Miranda warnings and took him to the Mound Road
Detention Center, where the Michigan Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”) held him until June 27.
Based on that, Plaintiff claims that: (1) he was
“subjected to the deprivation of liberty without
procedural due process by an intergovernmental agreement
between the City of Detroit and [MDOC] to lockup arrestees
who may be held for 72 hours”; and (2) he “was
willfully inflicted with severe mental and emotional distress
during the 72 hours of incarceration, knowing
intergovernmental agreement was the moving force behind the
the complaint liberally, Plaintiff fails to satisfy the basic
pleading requirements set forth in Twombly and
Iqbal. Rather than providing defendants fair notice
of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests, the
complaint consists merely of “naked assertions”
and “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation[s].” Plaintiff does not elaborate any basis
for his claim that he was deprived of his liberty without due
process. His conclusory allegations fail to specify what
specific conduct violated his rights, and how and/or why that
conduct violated his rights. Moreover, among other things,
Plaintiff fails to allege that the officers lacked probable
cause to arrest him. The complaint does not meet basic
addition to not satisfying the basic pleading standards,
Plaintiff's complaint fails to set forth a plausible
claim against either defendant.
complaint fails against Snyder because Plaintiff does not
allege that Snyder had any personal involvement with the
violation of his due process rights. See Frazier v.
Michigan, 41 Fed.Appx. 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were
personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal
the City of Detroit, Plaintiff's complaint fails because
he does not plead sufficient facts to state a plausible
municipal liability claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
municipality may be held liable only when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.
Furthermore, for municipal liability, there must be an
affirmative link between the policy and the particular
constitutional violation alleged.” Bennett v. City
of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
attaches an MDOC-issued announcement from 2013 stating that
the Mound Correctional Facility will serve as the City of
Detroit's lockup for arrestees. However, Plaintiff fails
to allege how this announcement is an official policy of the
City of Detroit. Moreover, even assuming the announcement is
an official policy, Plaintiff does not allege an
“affirmative link” between the purported policy
and his alleged due process violation that makes it plausible
that the policy was the “moving force” behind the
alleged violation. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312, 326 (1981) (holding that the “official policy must
be ‘the moving force of the constitutional
violation' in order to establish [municipal] liability .
. . under § 1983” (citation omitted)).
complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. The Court, therefore, DISMISSES this case ...