United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. JONKER CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Movant Effrem Riley's motion to vacate, set
aside or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF
No. 1.) The Government has filed a response (ECF No. 4) and
Movant has filed a motion to amend his motion under §
2255 (ECF No. 5), which the Court construes as a motion to
supplement. For the reasons that follow, both motions will be
2009, Movant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 841(b)(1)(A). (Plea
Agreement, United States v. Riley, No. 1:08-cr-337
(W.D. Mich.), ECF No. 15.) The Court sentenced him to a term
of 240 months in prison followed by 10 years of supervised
release. Movant's range of sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines (262 to 327 months) was enhanced by the
career-offender provision in § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines
because he had two prior convictions for a controlled
substance offense. However, the Court granted Movant's
motion for a downward variance and issued a sentence below
this range. Movant appealed his sentence, and the Court's
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 3,
initial motion under § 2255, Movant asserts the
following grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of
counsel at the plea stage; (2) the Court improperly
determined that he is a repeat offender under 21 U.S.C.
§ 851 and a career offender under the Sentencing
Guidelines for the same prior conviction; (3) he is entitled
to the benefit of Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines;
and (4) his sentence is unconstitutional because the
Sentencing Guidelines treated one gram of cocaine base as
equivalent to 100 grams of cocaine.
motion to supplement, Movant claims that he does not qualify
as a career offender under the Guidelines because at least
one of his two prior convictions does not qualify as a
controlled substance offense, in light of Johnson v.
United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), and Mathis v.
United States, 126 S.Ct. 2243 (2016).
asserts that Movant's claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. The Court agrees. The applicable limitation
period runs from the latest of-
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C § 2255(f).
case, as in most cases, the one-year statute of limitations
ran from the date on which the judgment of conviction became
final. Where, as here, a defendant pursues a direct appeal
but does not petition the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, the judgment becomes final when the time
expires for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003).
Such a petition is timely when it is filed within 90 days
after entry of the appellate court's judgment. Sup. Ct.
R. 13(3). In this case, the Court of Appeals' decision
issued on March 3, 2011. Consequently, the statute of