United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION & ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION (Dkt. 53) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SUBMIT A REPLY BRIEF (Dkt. 55)
A. GOLDSMITH United States District Judge
24, 2017, this Court granted Defendant's motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. 37) on the basis that Plaintiff
Peoples could not show that Defendant's legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for disciplining and terminating
him were mere pretexts for discrimination or retaliation; he
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to a Title
VII hostile work environment claim; his evidence of a hostile
work environment claim related to his disability was
unconnected to his disability and, in any case, the alleged
environment was insufficiently hostile as a matter of law;
and his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was
preempted by Michigan's Worker's Disability
Compensation Act. See generally 5/24/2017 Op. &
Order (Dkt. 51).
7, 2017, Peoples timely filed a motion for reconsideration
under Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(h),
claiming that this Court's May 24, 2017 opinion contained
“palpable defects” that, if corrected, would lead
to a different result. See Mot. for Reconsideration
at 1-2 (Dkt. 53). Notwithstanding his initial statement that
it was this Court that committed the errors,
however, Peoples then immediately state that his motion is
necessary to “correct and clarify the facts contained
in the record” and “clarify his position.”
Id. at 2. This concession accurately reflects why
his motion must be denied: his motion relies upon arguments
that could have been timely made, and evidence that could
have been timely added to the record.
STANDARD OF DECISION
7.1(h) of the Local Rules for the Eastern District of
Michigan provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be
granted only if the movant can (i) “demonstrate a
palpable defect by which the court and the parties . . . have
been misled, ” and (ii) show that “correcting the
defect will result in a different disposition of the
case.” E. D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). A “palpable
defect” is a defect which is obvious, clear,
unmistakable, manifest, or plain. Mktg. Displays, Inc. v.
Traffix Devices, Inc., 971 F.Supp. 262, 278 (E.D. Mich.
1997) (citing Webster's New World Dictionary 974 (3d ed.
1988)). A motion for reconsideration which presents the same
issues already ruled upon by the court, either expressly or
by reasonable implication, generally will not be granted.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3); see also Czajkowski v. Tindall
& Assocs., P.C., 967 F.Supp. 951, 952 (E.D. Mich.
response to a motion for reconsideration is permitted unless
the court orders otherwise. See E. D. Mich. LR
first argument concerns the analysis of his treatment at the
paint shop job that Peoples began shortly before he was
disciplined and terminated. See Pl. Mot. for
Reconsideration at 14. On this point, this Court held that
(i) Peoples could not show pretext for retaliation on
temporal proximity alone; and (ii) in the
alternative, Peoples admitted that he could not do the
job despite having been trained for it. 5/24/2017 Op. &
Order at 21-22 & n.14. In opposition to this reasoning,
Plaintiff cites the training rights protected by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between
Defendant and his union to prove that the training he
received was not adequate. See Pl. Mot. for
Reconsideration at 14-16. He does not offer argument or
evidence that the denial of adequate training was
does not point to any place in the record in which he cited
the CBA for the proposition that it granted him a certain
level of training that Defendant did not afford him before
disciplining him. The complaint does not mention the alleged
lack of training, or retaliation short of termination, at
all. See Compl. ¶¶ 23-25 (Dkt. 1).
Peoples' motion for partial summary judgment only
mentions the CBA in the context of rotation violations in
2011 and February 2013, see Pl. Mot. for. Summ. J.
at 7, 16, 23 (Dkt. 38), not training violations in 2014; and
his reply brief (Dkt. 47) does not mention the CBA at all.
His response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment
(Dkt. 42) does not mention the CBA. Peoples' 2015 EEOC
charge supports that he believed that he was asked to perform
the job “without adequate training, ”
see 2015 EEOC Charge, Ex. BB to Def. Mot. for Summ.
J. (Dkt. 37-29); yet he did not see fit to include this
argument in his briefing. This Court did not commit palpable
error for failing to consider evidence that Peoples did not
utilize in connection with his retaliation claim.
regarding the paint shop job, Peoples repeats his argument
that he protested that the job fell outside of his medical
restrictions. See Pl. Mot. for Reconsideration at
17. However, he makes no argument directed at this
Court's May 24, 2017 opinion, let alone identify how it
palpably erred. Because Peoples has not attempted to show
palpable error, this argument is rejected.
does Peoples' evidence support his argument,
notwithstanding his failure to focus on this Court's
opinion. He cites medical restrictions that
permitted limited lifting and bending to some
degree; then he claims that Brad Devine testified that the
paint shop job “required Plaintiff to engage in lifting
and bending at the torso level in violation of
Plaintiff's medical restrictions.” Pl. Mot. for
Reconsideration at 17. First, as Peoples frames them, his
restrictions do not prohibit all bending. Second, the instant
motion does not point to where in Devine's deposition
that Devine conceded that the job violated the
restrictions. Third, Devine actually testified that the
paint shop job fell within the restrictions. See
Devine Dep. Tr., Ex. T to Def. Mot. for Summ. J., at 94-95
also contests this Court's holding that he failed to
create a fact question whether he complied with the
“5-day letter, ” which required him to
substantiate his absence. See Pl. Mot. for
Reconsideration at 17. In support of his claim that he
submitted a doctor's note, Peoples offers his Employee
Medical Record, which does appear to show that a note was
submitted. See Empl. Med. Record, Ex. G to Pl. Mot.
for Reconsideration, at 1 (Dkt. 53-7). In his motion,
however, he did not cite this evidence; and, in his response
to Chrysler's motion, he only cited this document as
evidence of unrelated events that occurred in 2012.
See Pl. Resp. at 6. The document is not properly
considered on a motion for reconsideration for this purpose,
and this Court did not err by failing to scrutinize the
document for a particular significance other than the one
timely advanced by the party who offered it.
than citing his medical record, Peoples cited to the note
itself as proof that he submitted the note. See Pl.
Mot. for Summ. J. at 18. Likewise, in his response to
Defendant's motion, Peoples again only used the note
itself as proof of its submission. See Pl. Resp. to
Def. Mot. for Summ. J. at 10. And, for a third time, in his
reply brief, he cited the note itself as proof of its
submission to Defendant. See Pl. Reply at 3. In his
reply, Peoples also cited his own testimony that he brought
in some form of documentation; but in that testimony Peoples
stated that he was unsure of what he brought in or which
doctor wrote the note; and, in any case, he did not create a
fact question whether the note was
“satisfactory.” See id.; Pl. Dep. Tr.,
Ex. H to Pl. Reply, at 225-228 (Dkt. 47-8).
Peoples now cites the CBA for the proposition that his
October 29, 2014 documentation was satisfactory. Pl. Mot. for
Reconsideration at 18 (“Plaintiff's request for
leave was viable.”). As noted above, Peoples may not
newly invoke the CBA for a purpose that could have been
invoked during the normal course of briefing. Because Peoples
is attempting to untimely admit evidence that was not cited
for the instant purpose, it is not properly considered on a