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Malloy v. Bible

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

August 17, 2017

LINDA D. MALLOY, Plaintiff,
v.
WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY, Defendant.

          ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [DKT. NO. 22]

          DENISE PAGE HOOD CHIEF JUDGE

         This matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff's Motion For Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (the “Motion”) (Docket #22), wherein Plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin Defendant from “continu[ing] to infringe upon the Plaintiff's rights, ” id. at PgID 1339, and “immobiliz[ing] or caus[ing] detrimental physical impairment in retaliation to restrict the Plaintiff's presence on the court date.” Id. at 1356. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is denied.

         I. LEGAL STANDARD

         A court is to consider the following four factors in determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining order or other preliminary injunctive relief:

(1) whether the movant has shown a strong or substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits;
(2) whether the movant has shown that he or she would suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary relief is not issued;
(3) whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction will not cause substantial harm to third parties; and
(4) whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995); UASCO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1982); Mason County Med. Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977). The standard for preliminary injunction is not a rigid and comprehensive test, and the four factors are to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be satisfied, but instead “these factors simply guide the discretion of the court; they are not meant to be rigid and unbending requirements.” In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. 963 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992).

         II. FINDINGS OF THE COURT

         The Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's Motion, which consists of 22 pages of text and 23 pages of exhibits and pictures. Plaintiff sets forth a great deal of information or background regarding events she believes Defendant directed and controlled and she engages in a limited, conclusory analysis of the four injunctive factors set forth in Section I.

         The basis of Plaintiff's complaint is alleged actions of Defendant made in response to her desire to appeal the Court's denial of a previous motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 16. Plaintiff contends Defendant coordinated or caused a car to ram into Plaintiff's car, for which Plaintiff sought to obtain a personal protection order from Pittsfield Township and Washtenaw County. Dkt. No. 22, PgID 1340-41. Plaintiff suggests that Defendant interfered with the receipt of a credit card from Kohl's department store, a prescription (or multiple prescriptions) from CVS, and a check, often by actions associated with the U.S. Postal Service. Id. at PgID 1342-45. Plaintiff asserts, without any factual support or evidence, that “Defendant initiated 6 car accidents, with meaning behind them all, as they attempted to murder the Plaintiff” and offered a narrative about each of them. Id. at 1345-51. Plaintiff makes additional assertions in her Motion, id. at 1351-55, some of which she made in her previous motion for injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 15.

         The Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is likely to prevail on the merits of the relief she is seeking in the Motion. Her allegations in the Motion are similar in some respects to the underlying allegations set forth in her Complaint, [1] for which a clerk's entry of default was entered on Plaintiff's behalf two months before she filed the Motion and for which a default judgment hearing is scheduled on August 30, 2017, and those set forth in her prior Motion (Dkt. No. 15).

         With respect to the instant Motion, although Plaintiff has given detail regarding a number of car accidents and other events, Plaintiff has offered only conclusory allegations that Defendant was somehow involved . She has not offered any evidence or even detailed allegations how Defendant: (1) caused the automobile accidents; (2) obstructed her ability to get a PPO; (3) interfered with her ability to get a credit card from Kohl's; (4) stopped a CVS pharmacist from issuing medication to her; (5) had a medical device implanted - or not removed - from her body; (6) cut her hair; or (7) damaged items in her apartment. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a likelihood that she will establish that Defendant has engaged in any of the alleged actions against her. Although Plaintiff's allegations may serve as a basis for a finding of ...


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