United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
LINDA D. MALLOY, Plaintiff,
WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EMERGENCY
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER [DKT. NO. 22]
PAGE HOOD CHIEF JUDGE
matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff's
Motion For Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (the
“Motion”) (Docket #22), wherein Plaintiff asks
the Court to enjoin Defendant from “continu[ing] to
infringe upon the Plaintiff's rights, ”
id. at PgID 1339, and “immobiliz[ing] or
caus[ing] detrimental physical impairment in retaliation to
restrict the Plaintiff's presence on the court
date.” Id. at 1356. For the reasons stated
below, the Motion is denied.
is to consider the following four factors in determining
whether a plaintiff is entitled to a temporary restraining
order or other preliminary injunctive relief:
(1) whether the movant has shown a strong or substantial
likelihood or probability of success on the merits;
(2) whether the movant has shown that he or she would suffer
irreparable harm if the preliminary relief is not issued;
(3) whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction will not
cause substantial harm to third parties; and
(4) whether the public interest would be served by the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association,
Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995); UASCO Coal
Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir.
1982); Mason County Med. Ass'n v. Knebel, 563
F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977). The standard for preliminary
injunction is not a rigid and comprehensive test, and the
four factors are to be balanced, not prerequisites that must
be satisfied, but instead “these factors simply guide
the discretion of the court; they are not meant to be rigid
and unbending requirements.” In re Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. 963 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir. 1992).
FINDINGS OF THE COURT
Court has reviewed the Plaintiff's Motion, which consists
of 22 pages of text and 23 pages of exhibits and pictures.
Plaintiff sets forth a great deal of information or
background regarding events she believes Defendant directed
and controlled and she engages in a limited, conclusory
analysis of the four injunctive factors set forth in Section
basis of Plaintiff's complaint is alleged actions of
Defendant made in response to her desire to appeal the
Court's denial of a previous motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 16.
Plaintiff contends Defendant coordinated or caused a car to
ram into Plaintiff's car, for which Plaintiff sought to
obtain a personal protection order from Pittsfield Township
and Washtenaw County. Dkt. No. 22, PgID 1340-41. Plaintiff
suggests that Defendant interfered with the receipt of a
credit card from Kohl's department store, a prescription
(or multiple prescriptions) from CVS, and a check, often by
actions associated with the U.S. Postal Service. Id.
at PgID 1342-45. Plaintiff asserts, without any factual
support or evidence, that “Defendant initiated 6 car
accidents, with meaning behind them all, as they attempted to
murder the Plaintiff” and offered a narrative about
each of them. Id. at 1345-51. Plaintiff makes
additional assertions in her Motion, id. at 1351-55,
some of which she made in her previous motion for injunctive
relief. Dkt. No. 15.
Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is likely to prevail
on the merits of the relief she is seeking in the Motion. Her
allegations in the Motion are similar in some respects to the
underlying allegations set forth in her Complaint,
which a clerk's entry of default was entered on
Plaintiff's behalf two months before she filed the Motion
and for which a default judgment hearing is scheduled on
August 30, 2017, and those set forth in her prior Motion
(Dkt. No. 15).
respect to the instant Motion, although Plaintiff has given
detail regarding a number of car accidents and other events,
Plaintiff has offered only conclusory allegations that
Defendant was somehow involved . She has not offered
any evidence or even detailed allegations how Defendant: (1)
caused the automobile accidents; (2) obstructed her ability
to get a PPO; (3) interfered with her ability to get a credit
card from Kohl's; (4) stopped a CVS pharmacist from
issuing medication to her; (5) had a medical device implanted
- or not removed - from her body; (6) cut her hair; or (7)
damaged items in her apartment. The Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to establish a likelihood that she will
establish that Defendant has engaged in any of the alleged
actions against her. Although Plaintiff's allegations may
serve as a basis for a finding of ...