United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
G. Edmunds United States District Judge.
matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to
dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
(Docket 10.) Plaintiff's complaint arises out of a motor
vehicle accident and claims related to the Michigan No-Fault
Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3101, et seq.
Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's motion and
Defendant filed a reply. (Dkts. 12, 13.) The Court heard
Defendant's motion on August 16, 2017.
Advanced Surgery Center (“Plaintiff”) is a health
care provider who provided necessary medical services and
accommodations for Vaneshia Williams (not a party to this
action), after Williams sustained bodily injuries in a motor
vehicle accident. (Compl. ¶¶ 5-7.) The accident
occurred on September 8, 2015. (Def.'s Br. in Support of
Mot. Dismiss 1, dkt. 10.) Williams has a no fault policy with
Defendant, to cover the expenses incurred in the
accident. (Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff submitted to
Defendant proof of its charges for services it provided to
Williams for injuries that arose from the motor vehicle
accident. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Defendant did not pay Plaintiff
and Plaintiff brought this action for breach of contract,
initially filed in Wayne County Circuit Court, seeking
declaratory relief and a judgment in the amount of
approximately $75, 000.000, together with interest, costs and
attorneys fees. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-14.) Defendant
removed to this Court on January 16, 2017. (Dkt. 1.)
now seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of action on the
basis of the Michigan Supreme Court's recent decision in
Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 895 N.W.2d 490 (Mich. 2017), arguing that a
healthcare provider such as Plaintiff does not possess a
statutory cause of action against a No-Fault insurer for the
payment of an injured person's benefits. (Def.'s Mot.
seeks to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), alleging
that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a direct cause of
action against Defendant, and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), alleging
the "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted." Fed. R. Civ.
12(b)(1), (6). Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) provides the basis for a
motion to dismiss for “lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). “Standing
represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to
review at all stages of the litigation.” National
Org. For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S.
249, 255 (1994).
Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
fall into two general categories: facial attacks and factual
attacks. A facial attack is a challenge to the sufficiency of
the pleading itself. On such a motion, the court must take
the material allegations of the petition as true and
construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
A factual attack, on the other hand, is not a challenge to
the sufficiency of the pleading's allegations, but a
challenge to the factual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction. On such a motion, no presumptive truthfulness
applies to the factual allegations, and the court is free to
weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of
its power to hear the case.
U.S. v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citations and emphasis omitted).
respect to “failure to state a claim, ” the Sixth
Circuit noted that under the United States Supreme
Court's heightened pleading standard laid out in Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), “a
complaint only survives a motion to dismiss if it contains
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Estate of
Barney v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 714
F.3d 920, 924 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The court in Estate of Barney
goes on to state that under Iqbal, “[a] claim
is plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Furthermore, while the "plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement, ' . . . it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not
‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'” Estate of Barney, 714 F.3d at
924 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). If the plaintiffs do "not nudge[
] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
their complaint must be dismissed." Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. Finally, the Court must keep in mind that
“on a motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Id. at 555 (quotation and
attached to the pleadings become part of the pleadings and
may be considered on a motion to dismiss.”
Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co.,
508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P.
10(c)). "A court may consider matters of public record
in deciding a motion to dismiss without converting the motion
to one for summary judgment.” Id. at 336.
"In addition, when a document is referred to in the
pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered
without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary
judgment." Id. at 335-36; see also
Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 514
(6th Cir. 1999)(documents not attached to the pleadings may
still be considered part of the pleadings when the
“document is referred to in the complaint and is
central to the plaintiff's claim”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Whether Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Bring ...