United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III, United States District Judge
the Court is the second motion for summary judgment of
Defendant VHS Detroit Receiving Hospital, Inc. (DRH). The
Court granted the first motion, and Plaintiff Karon Jackson
appealed. The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed and
remanded the case. DRH then moved for leave to file a second
motion for summary judgment, which the Court granted. The
Court has reviewed the briefs and finds that a hearing is
unnecessary. See E.D. Mich. 7.1(f)(2). For the
following reasons, the Court will deny DRH's second
motion for summary judgment.
facts of the case were laid out in the Court's previous
order (ECF 21) and in the Court of Appeal's opinion (ECF
25). In brief: Jackson worked as a mental health technician
at the Detroit Receiving Hospital from 1988 to 2013. She was
terminated after she escorted the wrong patient out of the
hospital's Crisis Center. She filed a charge of sex
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which ultimately issued her a notice of dismissal
and her right to sue. She did sue, and the result is this
judgment is proper if there is "no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material
for purposes of summary judgment if its resolution would
establish or refute an "essential element of a cause
of action or defense asserted by the parties[.]"
Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir.
considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must
view the facts and draw all inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Stiles ex rel. D.S. v.
Grainger Cty., Tenn., 819 F.3d 834, 848 (6th Cir. 2016).
The Court must then determine "whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). And although
the Court may not make credibility judgments or weigh the
evidence, Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201, 204
(6th Cir. 2015), a mere "scintilla" of evidence is
insufficient to survive summary judgment; "there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff, " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
sex-discrimination cases like this one, the Court employs the
burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the
framework, Jackson has the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to
DRH to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
its employment decision. Jackson then must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the DRH's
justification was a pretext for discrimination. Id.
opposition to the first motion for summary judgment, Jackson
argued that she was similarly situated to two other male
employees who were not terminated for similar actions: Ronald
Duncan and Lester Little. The Court found that Jackson
established a prima facie case as to Duncan, ECF 21, PgID
292-93, and the Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion
as to both Duncan and Little. Jackson v. VHS Detroit
Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir.
DRH claimed it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for firing Jackson but not Duncan or Little. Specifically,
DRH argued that Jackson's mistake was more egregious than
either Duncan's or Little's mistakes. But the Court
of Appeals concluded that:
when all relevant evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to Jackson, and all reasonable inferences are drawn
in her favor, the circumstances surrounding her termination
would permit a reasonable jury to infer that DRH's
justifications for her termination were pretextual, and that
she was instead terminated because of her sex.
Id. at 779, and remanded the case.
DRH has sought and received leave to file a second motion for
summary judgment for the purpose of expanding the factual
record.See ECF 36, PgID 357. The new
facts are not voluminous: they are simply three short
declarations by DRH employees involved in and familiar with
Jackson's termination. So the Court must ...