United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III, United States District Judge
Linda Parker filed a proposed class complaint against
Defendants Equifax Information Services, LLC and Wilson
Technologies, Inc. for alleged willful violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et
seq. Parker voluntarily dismissed her claims against
Wilson Tech, and has moved for leave to amend her complaint.
The Court held a hearing on February 7, 2017.
tried to buy a vehicle from Suburban Cadillac Buick, an auto
dealership for which Wilson Tech provides "technical and
retail support, " identity-verification services, and
retail and sales management. ECF 25-2 ¶¶ 8-9, 17.
She received a copy of her "credit
report" from Equifax-a consumer reporting
agency-and discovered that Wilson Tech "made two
inquiries" about her credit without her permission.
Id. ¶ 11-12. Wilson Tech denied that it
accessed the report, and stated that the dealership verified
Parker's identity using Wilson Tech's "automated
system." Id. ¶ 15-16.
asserts by implication that the "automated system"
utilized two Equifax products: (1) a subscription to
"eIDcompare, " a tool that verifies personal
information for legal and regulatory compliance, and
generates alerts for possible instances of identity theft;
and (2) a subscription to "[Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC)] Alert Services, " which verifies
consumers by automatically screening new and existing
accounts, crosschecking its database when a credit report is
requested, and issuing a notice that the data was verified
against the database. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. The
eIDcompare product, in particular, receives from its
subscribers data packets that include fields for a
consumer's name, phone number, social security number,
date of birth, driver's license, current address, and
time spent at that address. Id. ¶¶ 23-24.
Parker alleges that Wilson Tech purchased the eIDcompare and
OFAC Alert Services "in relation to [her] and a class of
all other persons similarly situated." Id.
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), a court should
"freely give leave" for a party to file an amended
complaint "when justice so requires." District
courts can, however, deny a motion for leave to amend on the
basis of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . .
. [or] futility of amendment." Prater v. Ohio Educ.
Ass'n, 505 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
"Amending would be futile if a proposed amendment would
not survive a motion to dismiss." SFS Check, LLC v.
First Bank of Delaware, 774 F.3d 351, 355 (6th Cir.
2014). Accordingly, the proposed amended pleading must
"raise a right to relief above the speculative
level" and "state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride,
Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
proposed amended class complaint, Parker has abandoned her
claim against Wilson Tech and added a claim against Equifax
under § 1681g(a), which requires a consumer reporting
agency to provide to consumers clear and accurate consumer
disclosures. ECF 25-2, PgID 102-03. Parker argues that the
amendment accounts for two possible alternatives:
(1) Equifax provided a consumer report and disclosed the
middle-man (Wilson Tech) but failed to disclose the end-user
as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3); or
(2) Equifax provided a false consumer disclosure to Plaintiff
by disclosing that a consumer report was provided to Wilson
Tech when it was not, in violation of § 1681[g](a).
ECF 31, PgID 183. Parker seeks further discovery to
"ascertain exactly what information was reported and to
whom, if at all, " because without the information she
"cannot reasonably determine which of the two possible
alternatives is at play." Id. at 184. Equifax,
on the other hand, maintains the amendment is futile and
15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3): "Reporting"
proposed amended complaint alleges that Equifax violated
§ 1681g(a)(3). That section requires a consumer
reporting agency to "disclose to the consumer . . .
[i]dentification of each person (including each end-user
identified under section 1681e(e)(1) of this title) that
procured a consumer report-(i) for employment purposes,
during the 2-year period preceding the date on which the
request is made; or (ii) for any other purpose, during the
1-year period preceding the date on which the request is
made." Parker alleges that the Equifax products to which
Wilson Tech subscribed, eIDcompare and OFAC Alert Services,
could provide significant biographical information about
consumers, and Parker further alleges the general features
and capabilities of the products. See ECF 25-2
¶ 24, ¶¶ 30-33 (listing the products'
various capabilities). She claims that Wilson Tech has a
customer ID from Equifax for both products, used eIDcompare
to verify consumers for its subscribers, and purchased both
products from Equifax "in relation to [Parker] and a
class of all other persons similarly situated."
Id. ¶¶ 25-29. But Parker does ...