United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. JONKER CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the Court is
required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.
Lance Adam Goldman presently is incarcerated with the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Parnall
Correctional Facility (SMT). Plaintiff sues the State of
Michigan and its Department of Corrections, MDOC Director
Heidi Washington, SMT Warden Melinda Braman, and SMT Nurse
arrived at SMT on June 26, 2017. He complains that A-Unit of
SMT is dirty and mold-infested, and that, because one
bathroom is under construction, he is exposed to chemicals
and fumes and lacks adequate access to bathroom facilities.
He contends that the dirty, damp, dusty, and moldy conditions
are dangerous to prisoner health and safety and that
Defendants have elected to disregard the unsanitary
August 14, 2017, Plaintiff developed flu-like symptoms. On
August 16, 2017, he sought urgent medical care, because he
was coughing up “green and yellow phlegm with black
specs.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Defendant Nurse
Jim examined him, but merely provided him five packs of
Aypanal, a type of acetominophen. Nurse Jim did not schedule
a follow-up appointment. Later that day, Plaintiff sent a
letter to Defendant Washington, complaining about Nurse
Jim's “obvious inadequate medical care and
treatment.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he
continued to be ill as of the filing of his complaint on
August 21, 2017, and that he was feverish and coughing up
mucus that contained specks of blood.
also alleges that, beginning on August 1, 2017, he served
five days of toplock and 30 days' loss of privileges,
after being convicted of a Class-II misconduct. At the end of
his toplock period, he allegedly did not receive out-of-cell
recreation time, as he should have under the policy. He
argues that being kept from out-of-cell exercise for 30 days
during his loss-of-privileges sanction amounts to an Eighth
acknowledges that he has not exhausted his administrative
remedies, noting that he filed his grievance at the same time
he filed his complaint. He argues that exhausting the
grievance process would be futile, so he seeks immediate
relief in this Court. He seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief, together with compensatory and punitive damages.
Failure to State a Claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement, ' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549
(6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for
vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive
rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983
is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly
infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
State of Michigan & MDOC
may not maintain a § 1983 action against the State of
Michigan and the Michigan Department of Corrections.
Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and
their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment
from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived
immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978);
O'Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir.
1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not
consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick
v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In
numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has
specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from
suit under the Eleventh Amendment, regardless of the form of
relief requested by the Plaintiff. See,
e.g., McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App'x
646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); Turnboe v. Stegall, No.
00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In
addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the Michigan
Department of ...