United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read
Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
Michael Lynn Anderson presently is incarcerated with the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Earnest C.
Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF). He sues the Muskegon
Police Department (MPD), Muskegon County, the City of
Muskegon, the MDOC, and the following individual Defendants:
Assistant Prosecutors Brett Gardner and Les Bowen;
Prosecuting Attorney D.J. Hilson; City of Muskegon City
Attorney Theodore Williams, Jr.; MDOC Probation Officer Karen
Buie; MPD Detective Emilio Treja; LRF Warden Shirlee Harry;
Two unidentified police officers (Unknown Part(y)(ies) #1 and
#2); and unnamed other actors (Unknown Part(y)(ies) #3).
September 2003, Plaintiff was on probation, under the
supervision of Defendant Buie. On September 26, 2003, Unknown
Part(y)(ies) #1 and #2 arrested Plaintiff in his home.
Plaintiff was taken before a judge the following day for a
preliminary probation-violation hearing, at which the court
set the full probation-violation hearing for October 3, 2003.
Plaintiff was held in the Muskegon County Jail from the time
of the arrest until the formal hearing. On October 3, 2003,
the court found that no grounds existed to find that
Plaintiff had violated his probation. The court therefore
ordered Plaintiff released from jail.
alleges that Defendant Buie fabricated the allegations that
Plaintiff had violated his probation, in order to detain
Plaintiff on a murder for which he was never charged. More
specifically, he contends that Defendant Buie conspired with
Defendants Prosecutor Gardner and Detective Treja to obtain a
warrant to arrest him on the falsified probation violations,
because they could not obtain a warrant on the murder charge.
complains that Defendants Buie, Treja, and Gardner conspired
in his false arrest and imprisonment. He also alleges that
Defendants Muskegon Police Department, City of Muskegon,
MDOC, Warden Harry, Prosecutors Bowen, Gardner, and Hilson,
and Detective Treja, as well as others not named as
Defendants, restrained his liberty without due process of
law. In addition, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Buie,
Treja, and Gardner deprived him of a fair and impartial
investigation, in violation of the Michigan constitution, and
subjected him to intentional infliction of emotional
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement, ' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to
determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69
(1985). For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under §
1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10); Carroll v.
Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at
*1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the claim for relief,
however, is a question of federal law. Collyer v.
Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996); Sevier v.
Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute
of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows
or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his
action. Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220.
complaint is untimely. He asserts claims arising in September
and October 2003. Plaintiff had reason to know of the
“harms” done to him at the time they occurred.
Hence, his claims accrued in 2003. However, he did not file
his complaint until August 2017, many years after
Michigan's three-year limitations period expired.
Moreover, Michigan law no longer tolls the running of the
statute of limitations when a plaintiff is incarcerated.
See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5851(9). Further, it
is well established that ignorance of the law does not
warrant equitable tolling of a statute of limitations.
See Rose v. Dole, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.
1991); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 385
(6th Cir. 1991); Mason v. Dep't of Justice, No.
01-5701, 2002 WL 1334756, at *2 (6th Cir. June 17, 2002).
plaintiff's allegations “show that relief is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is
subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim . . .
.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
Because Plaintiff's complaint is clearly ...