United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION
AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
VICTORIA A. ROBERTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Mark A. Lane, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Petitioner alleges in his petition that (1) his detention is
illegal due to an invalid sentence, (2) the judgment and
commitment order in his criminal case is void, (3) his
sentence is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, and (4) he is entitled to have false information
in his pre-sentence report and his judgment and commitment
order expunged. Because Petitioner has failed to show that a
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 is an inadequate or ineffective remedy for
his claims, the Court dismisses the habeas petition without
petition and attachments indicate that, on September 10,
2001, Petitioner pleaded guilty, as charged, to: (1) one
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
to distribute methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and (2) one count of
conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(h). On February 28,
2002, United States District Judge Richard L. Young of the
Southern District of Indiana sentenced Petitioner to
concurrent terms of 360 months (thirty years) in prison for
the methamphetamine conviction and 240 months (twenty years)
in prison for the money-laundering conviction, followed by
five years of supervised release. On appeal, Petitioner
challenged the trial court's imposition of a three-level
upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) for his
aggravating role in the offense. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed
by Judge Young. See United States v. Lane, 52 F.
App'x 838 (7th Cir. 2002).
filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
under § 2255, but the trial court dismissed his motion.
See United States v. Lane, Nos. EV0103CR01-YH,
3:04CV0037, 2005 WL 1421496 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2005)
(unpublished). Since 2010, Petitioner has filed numerous
other motions, which attacked the trial court's
jurisdiction and sought discharge of the judgment. The
Seventh Circuit fined Petitioner in 2014 and barred him from
filing any additional civil suits in the courts of that
circuit until Petitioner paid the fine. See Lane v.
Maye, No. 16-3056-JWL, 2016 WL 913140, at *1 n.1 (D.
Kan. Mar. 9, 2016) (unpublished).
2016, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, which the District of Kansas dismissed
without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. See id.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
See Lane v. Maye, 667 F. App'x 698 (10th Cir.
2016). Finally, On July 24, 2017, Petitioner filed his habeas
petition in this district.
receipt of a habeas petition, a federal court must
“promptly examine [the] petition to determine if it
plainly appears from the face of the petition and any
exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief.” Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 396
n.2 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). And if the
petition appears legally insufficient on its face, a federal
court may summarily dismiss the petition. McFarland v.
Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994).
issue here is whether Petitioner may bring his claims under
28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed
that “[a] challenge to the validity of a federal
conviction or sentence is generally brought as a habeas
corpus petition pursuant to § 2255, while a petition
concerning the manner or execution of a sentence is
appropriate under § 2241.” Hill v.
Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing
United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th
Cir. 2001)); accord Terrell v. United States, 564
F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009)(stating that “[s]ection
2255 provides the primary avenue of relief for federal
prisoners ‘claiming the right to release' as a
result of an unlawful sentence”) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a)); Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753,
755-56 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that “claims asserted by
federal prisoners that seek to challenge their convictions or
imposition of their sentence shall be filed in the sentencing
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and that claims seeking to
challenge the execution or manner in which the sentence is
served shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction over
the prisoner's custodian under 28 U.S.C. §
2241”) (internal and end citations omitted).
grounds for relief challenge his federal sentence, as opposed
to the execution or manner in which he is serving his
sentence. As such, the proper remedy for his claims is a
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under
§ 2255. Petitioner may bring his claims under §
2241 only if the claims fall within the “savings
clause” of § 2255, which permits a prisoner to
apply for the writ of habeas corpus when it “appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. §
appears to allege that § 2255 is inadequate because it
limits the number of motions that a prisoner may file.
See Pet., page 5, ¶ 10(c). It is true that
prisoners are limited in their ability to file multiple
motions under § 2255. A second or successive motion must
be based on “newly discovered evidence” or
“a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to
cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
But “§ 2255 is not ‘inadequate or
ineffective' merely because habeas relief has previously
been denied, a § 2255 motion is procedurally barred, or
the petitioner has been denied permission to file a
successive motion.” Hill, 836 F.3d at 594
(citing Charles, 180 F.3d at 756). Thus, § 2255
is not inadequate or ineffective simply because Petitioner
has already filed one or more unsuccessful motions under
savings clause of § 2255(e) can apply when a
petitioner makes a claim of actual innocence, Bannerman
v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2003), but the
Supreme Court has stated that “ ‘actual
innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal
insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 623 (1998)). The petitioner must point to a
decision demonstrating that he “stands convicted of
‘an act that the law does not make criminal.'
” Id. at 620 (quoting Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). Or, as explained in
[w]here a petitioner asserts factual innocence of his crime
of conviction due to a change of law, he may show that his
remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective by
satisfying four conditions: (1) “the existence of a new
interpretation of statutory law, ” (2) “issued
after the petitioner had a meaningful time to incorporate the
new interpretation into his direct appeals or subsequent
motions, ” (3) that is retroactive, and (4) applies to