United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Seniqua Jamison, proceeding pro se, has sued Defendants,
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS)
(identified as Child Protective Services (CPS)) and three
MDHHS employees, Julianne Weick, Stesha Miller-Jones, and
Shalyn Lowe (collectively MDHHS Defendants); Lutheran Social
Services of Michigan n/k/a Samaritas; and Judith Raskiewicz,
alleging a number of claims arising out of the removal of her
three oldest children by CPS and termination of her parental
rights as to those children, as well as events that occurred
after the removal. Jamison's claims include: (1) unlawful
CPS petition for removal; (2) unlawful ex parte order; (3)
unlawful jurisdiction; (4) unlawful seizure; (5) unlawful
placement in foster care; (6) abuse in licensed foster care;
(7) unlawful case service plan; (8) violation of reasonable
efforts statutes; (9) violation of child best interest status
(sic); (10) unlawful coercion waiver of rights amended
petition; (11) defense attorney ineffective; (12) unlawful
termination of parental rights; (13) CPS conceals false
witnesses; and (14) unlawful placement on the central
MDHHS Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Jamison's
claims on various grounds. In addition, Samaritas has filed a
motion to dismiss. Jamison has filed a response, which is not
particularly responsive to Defendants' arguments.
following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants'
motions. In addition, although Defendant
Raskiewicz-Jamison's attorney in the removal
proceedings-has not filed a motion to dismiss, because
Jamison is proceeding in forma pauperis, and his complaint
fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see
also Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th
Cir. 1999) (holding that “§ 1915(e)(2) applies
only to in forma pauperis proceedings”).
following facts are based on Jamison's allegations in her
pro se complaint. On July 1, 2014, Jamison's parental
rights with regard to her three oldest children were
terminated pursuant to an order issued by Kent County Family
Court Judge Patrick Hillary. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.10, 27.)
Jamison alleges that there was insufficient evidence to
support the removal order and that the petition submitted by
Defendant Weick in support of the removal order falsely
alleged that the children were in immediate danger.
(Id. at PageID.10-11, 24-25.) Jamison waived her
parental rights over the children. (Id. at
PageID.38.) Pursuant to Michigan law, Jamison was ordered to
participate in a Parent Agency Case Service Plan,
administered by Samaritas. (Id. at PageID.32-33.)
Samaritas recommended that Jamison's parental rights be
terminated because she failed to complete the program.
(Id. at PageID.33-34; ECF No. 19-2 (termination
about June 30, 2016, Jamison gave birth to a fourth child,
whom she conceived with a man named “Mr.
Merriweather.” (Id. at PageID.12-13.) Because
of the prior order terminating Jamison's parental rights,
the fourth child was immediately removed from Jamison's
care. (Id. at PageID.12.) Jamison was referred to a
Family Reunification Program (FRP). Jamison participated in
the program, and on February 23, 2017, the newborn was
returned to Jamison. (Id. at PageID.12.)
April 25, 2017, CPS agents Defendants Miller-Jones and Lowe
went to Jamison's residence to investigate an anonymous
tip that Jamison and Merriweather were “using drugs,
alcohol, driving while under the influence with their Child
in the car, that there was no food in the house and the Child
was being neglected.” (Id. at PageID.13.)
Defendants arrived at Jamison's residence while MDHHS
reunification specialists were present. Defendants demanded
access to the home, and Jamison consented to Lowe's entry
because Lowe threatened to get a removal order for the
newborn if Jamison did not consent. (Id. at
PageID.16.) The case was closed on May 18, 2017, after a
hearing in which the court found Jamison and Merriweather fit
parents. (Id. at PageID. 19.) Jamison alleges that,
in spite of the court's finding, Defendant Lowe continued
her investigation by, among other things, interviewing
Merriweather's eleven-year-old son at his school.
(Id. at PageID.19-20.)
alleges that she is pregnant again but does not have an open
case with an unidentified safety threat to her unborn child.
However, at a checkup, the social worker who works at the
clinic informed Jamison that CPS guidelines required her to
report Jamison's pregnancy to CPS. The social worker also
informed Jamison that there was a possibility that CPS could
take Jamison's unborn child because of the prior
termination of Jamison's parental rights. (Id.
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if
“‘it fails to give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's
allegations must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 129
S.Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not
equivalent to a “‘probability requirement, '
. . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft, 129
S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' -
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
MDHHS Defendants' Motion
The Eleventh Amendment bars Jamison's ...