United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read
Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint
against Defendants Jessica Knack, Christine L. Henson,
Matthew R. Luttrell, Susan Wilson, Perri A. Cooper, Marie L.
Drouin, Cynthia M. Jenkins, Sharon Starr, Marie Bennett, Dawn
R. Eicher, Matthew Sizer, Shelly A. Ronquist, Lori L. Davis,
Duncan MacLaren, Jim Armstrong, L. Berlinger, Mike Curley,
Unknown Parties, and S. Farley for failure to state a claim.
The Court will order service on Defendants Carol Williams, L.
Schwesinger, M. Dicken, B. Johnson, B. Mastaw, Robert
Beaudion, Unknown Raffaele, Marquita Marlette, K. Olson,
Charles Simons, Kimberly Franckowlak, and Penny Rogers.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in
Baraga, Baraga County, Michigan. The events about which he
complains, however, occurred at the Kinross Correctional
Facility (KCF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan.
Plaintiff sues Medical Service Providers Carol Williams,
Jessica Knack, Christine L. Henson, Matthew R. Luttrell,
Susan Wilson, Perri A. Cooper, Marie L. Drouin, Cynthia M.
Jenkins, Sharon Starr, Marie Bennett, Dawn R. Eicher, Matthew
Sizer, Shelly A. Ronquist, and Lori L. Davis. Plaintiff also
sues Assistant Resident Unit Manager Marquita Marlette,
Deputy Warden K. Olson, Warden Duncan MacLaren, Grievance
Coordinators Jim Armstrong, L. Berlinger, and Mike Curley,
Dentist Charles Simons, Dental Hygienist Kimberly
Franckowlak, Nurse Practitioner Penny Rogers, Sergeant L.
Schwesinger, Assistant Resident Unit Manager M. Dicken,
Sergeant B. Johnson, Corrections Officer B. Mastaw,
Corrections Officer Robert Beaudion, Captain Unknown
Raffaele, Unknown Parties Medical Service Provider or Prison
Officials, and Hearing Investigator S. Farley.
alleges that on October 15, 2012, Defendant Simons failed to
provide Plaintiff with needed dental care. On October 26,
2012, Defendant Franckowlak failed to provide Plaintiff with
needed dental care. On December 8, 2012, Defendant
Schwesinger had Plaintiff placed in administrative
segregation under false pretenses and ignored Plaintiff's
complaints of harassment by prison officers. Defendant
Schwesinger also collaborated with Defendants Williams,
Henson, Bennett, Mastaw, Beaudion, Raffaele, and Johnson to
deprive Plaintiff of pain medication and dental care.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Beaudion and Mastaw set him
up for false misconduct tickets. On December 10, 2012,
Defendants Dicken, Olson, and Marlette falsified the record
of Plaintiff's SCC (Security Classification Committee)
review by stating that Plaintiff was in fear of his safety
from staff due to racial issues, but that there was no proof
that Plaintiff had been threatened. Plaintiff states that he
had actually requested protection because he was afraid that
he would be attacked by other inmates.
the SCC interview, Defendant Beaudion set Plaintiff up on a
gambling misconduct. On December 11, 2012, Defendant Johnson
reviewed Plaintiff on the misconduct ticket. Defendant Farley
authored a hearing investigation report shortly thereafter,
which did not reflect Plaintiff's comments to Defendant
Johnson. On December 13, 2012, Defendant Raffaele ignored
Plaintiff's complaints regarding the inaccuracies in the
ticket written by Defendant Beaudion. Plaintiff claims that
his confinement in administrative segregation prevented him
from seeking treatment for serious medical conditions. When
Plaintiff asked Defendant Raffaele to destroy the misconduct
report, Defendant Raffaele became threatening and caused
Plaintiff to fear for his life. Plaintiff was unable to sleep
for two days.
alleges that between December 8, 2012, and January 3, 2013,
Defendants Williams, Knack, Henson, Luttrell, Wilson, Cooper,
Drouin, Jenkins, Starr, Bennett, Eicher, Sizer, Ronquist,
Davis, Rogers, and Unknown Parties denied Plaintiff
prescribed pain medication, as well as other treatment for a
tumor in Plaintiff's femur and for his dental problems.
Plaintiff also claims that in September of 2012, Defendants
McLean, Curley, Armstrong, Berlinger, and MacLaren were
responsible for Plaintiff being placed on modified access to
the grievance procedure. Finally, Plaintiff claims that in
November of 2013, he had “encounters” with
Defendant Olson on two occasions, during which Plaintiff
complained of harassment, retaliatory cell searches, and
threats of misconduct reports.
claims that Defendants violated his rights under the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement, ' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to
determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69
(1985). For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under '
1983, the statute of limitations is three years. See
Mich. Comp. Laws ' 600.5805(10); Carroll v.
Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at
*1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the claim for relief,
however, is a question of federal law. Collyer v.
Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996); Sevier v.
Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute
of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows
or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his
action. Collyer, 98 F.3d at 220.
complaint is untimely. He asserts claims arising in September
of 2012 through January of 2013. Plaintiff had reason to know
of the “harms” done to him at the time they
occurred. Hence, his claims accrued no later than January of
2013. However, the Court did not receive Plaintiff's
complaint for filing until March 2, 2017. In addition,
Plaintiff did not sign his complaint until February 20, 2017,
well past Michigan's three-year limit. Moreover, Michigan
law no longer tolls the running of the statute of limitations
when a plaintiff is incarcerated. See Mich. Comp.
Laws ' 600.5851(9). Further, it is well established that
ignorance of the law does not warrant equitable tolling of a
statute of limitations. See Rose ...