United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division
OPINION
GORDON
J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This is
an action brought by a federal prisoner. He is proceeding
in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), the
Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought
under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The Court
must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint
as frivolous.
Discussion
I.
Factual allegations
Plaintiff,
Robert Andrew Faber, is presently incarcerated at Federal
Correctional Institution Miami. On March 8, 2017, Plaintiff
entered a plea of guilty to three supervised release
violations. (No. 2:05-cr-53 (W.D. Mich.), J., ECF No. 96.) He
is serving a sentence of 12 months' incarceration, to be
followed by a 24 month term of supervised release.
(Id.) Among the special conditions of supervision
for Plaintiff's supervised release is a requirement that
he have no contact or association with a former roommate.
(Id., PageID.267.) It is that special condition that
lies at the heart of Plaintiff's action against
Defendants Elizabeth Carey and Amanda Terburg.
Plaintiff's
initial supervised release was conditioned upon him staying
at a residential reentry center, in this instance the
Kalamazoo Probation Enhancement Program (KPEP) in Kalamazoo,
Michigan. Plaintiff's initial supervised release was also
conditioned on him participating in mental health treatment
and sex offender treatment. Plaintiff participated in the
KPEP treatment programs while he resided there. He continued
with the KPEP treatment programs after he obtained employment
and moved into independent housing.
KPEP is
a private non-profit Michigan corporation. KPEP describes its
mission as follows:
KPEP began in the fall of 1980 to provide a live-in residence
for those individuals who need more structure than regular
probation provides, but where extended jail time is not
judged necessary. The goal of KPEP is to show the residents
that they can become independent, contributing members of
society. The organization works closely with all aspects of
the criminal justice system, including local law enforcement
departments, corrections and probation departments, and
various circuit court judges.
Over the years, the populations served by KPEP have changed
and now include: felony probationers, state parolees, Drug
Treatment Court participants, SAI probationers and parolees,
federal inmates, federal probationers, and clients who are
currently on federal pre-trial status.
See http://kpep.com/about.
Defendants,
Elizabeth Carey and Amanda Terburg, served as Plaintiff's
outpatient therapists at KPEP. In that role, they completed a
report of Plaintiff's progress through the end of
January, 2017. That report, in part, formed the basis for the
special condition that limits Plaintiff's contact with
his former roommate. Plaintiff is suing Defendants Carey and
Terburg for allegedly lying on the report. Plaintiff claims
the therapists committed perjury and that they conspired with
Plaintiff's probation officer to accomplish that end.
Plaintiff contends that the federal crimes of perjury and
conspiracy are “the federal claims made” in this
action. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages, criminal prosecution of Defendants, and
reversal of any adverse judgment their report caused at
Faber's violation hearing.[1]
This is
not Plaintiff's first action raising claims against
Defendants Carey and Terburg. In Faber v. Web et
al., No. 1:17-cv-433 (W.D. Mich.), Plaintiff sued Carey,
Terburg, and their supervisor Ann Web because “the
above therapists lied about Mr. Faber on his treatment file,
which was later used in a violation [hearing] by Faber's
probation officer T. Smith . . . .” (No. 1:17-cv-433,
Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) In Plaintiff's first
action, he sought monetary damages, prosecution of
Defendants, retraction of all false statements, and
investigation of KPEP. That action was dismissed for failure
to state a claim on July 7, 2017. (No. 1:17-cv-433, Op. &
J., ECF Nos. 12, 13.)
II.
Duplicative actions are frivolous
Plaintiffs
generally have “no right to maintain two separate
actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in
the same court and against the same defendants.”
Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir.
1977).[2] Accordingly, as part of its inherent power
to administer its docket, a district court may dismiss a suit
that is duplicative of another federal court suit. See
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Adamsv. California
Dep't of Health Serv., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir.
2007); Missouri v. Prudential Health Care Plan,
Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953-54 (8th Cir. 2001); Curtis
v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2000);
Smith v. SEC, 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997). The
power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to foster
judicial economy and the “comprehensive disposition of
litigation, ...