United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Northern Division
J. QUIST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action
brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read
Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are
clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a claim.
is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility
(IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. The events about
which he complains, however, occurred at the Alger
Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County,
Michigan, and at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in
Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Unknown
Parties #1 “Seven Unknown Treatment Team, ”
Unknown Party #1 “Deputy Warden for Security, ”
Unknown Party #2 “Medical Administrator, ” Warden
Robert Napel, Unknown Party #3 “Deputy Warden for
Administrator, ” Kathleen A. Mutscher, PH.D.
“Director of Mental Health Services, ” and
Unknown Parties #2 “Trustees for Michigan Master Health
amended complaint (ECF No. 8), Plaintiff alleges that he
arrived at LMF in the beginning of 2014, and refused to go to
the general population. Therefore, Plaintiff was placed in
segregation. A few days later, Plaintiff was shown a ticket
which falsely asserted that a weapon had been found in his
property. A prison counselor interviewed Plaintiff on two
occasions. After being interviewed the second time, Plaintiff
was taken to a building for a video conference with an
unknown woman. The woman asked Plaintiff how he was doing, as
well as other questions. After the conference, the woman told
officers not to rough Plaintiff up. Shortly thereafter,
Plaintiff was transferred to MBP.
Plaintiff arrived at MBP, an unknown official took Plaintiff
to a conference room and asked Plaintiff if he was going to
be a problem. Plaintiff said that he was not. A half dozen
officers then grabbed him and escorted him to Query Unit.
Officials placed Plaintiff in a cell and told him to strip
naked. Plaintiff was then given a “Bam-Bam”
(suicide) gown. Plaintiff met with a psychologist twice in
the following days. At some point, Plaintiff was drawing a
picture out of the Parkinson's law book when the
“psyche” walked past Plaintiff's cell. The
“psyche” saw the stick figures that Plaintiff was
drawing and asked if he could make a copy. Plaintiff refused.
During the hearing on Plaintiff's involuntary treatment,
the “psyche” presented a drawing which he claimed
was based on Plaintiff's drawing. When asked, Plaintiff
admitted that he had drawn the picture, but Plaintiff was not
allowed to explain why he had drawn it or what it
represented. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing,
Plaintiff was diagnosed with a psychotic disorder and it was
determined that Plaintiff should be involuntarily medicated.
Plaintiff appealed the determination, but his appeal was
denied. Plaintiff was placed in segregation and was not
allowed to go to the law library. Plaintiff claims that he
was never told that he could appeal again.
claims Defendants' conduct violated his rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under state law.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.
Failure to state a claim
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it
fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain
detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations
must include more than labels and conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement, ' . . . it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not ‘show[n]' - that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies
to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal
Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street
v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.
1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself,
the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify
the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
the Court notes that Plaintiff fails to make specific factual
allegations against Defendants in this case. Plaintiff's
allegations merely recite what happened to him at LMF and
MBP, without any reference to the identity of the specific
individuals involved in his treatment. Government officials
may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or
vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676;
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d
484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation
must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir.
2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir.
2002). The acts of one's subordinates are not enough; nor
can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to
act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310
F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th
Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be
imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative
grievance or failed to act based upon information contained
in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d
295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the
official's own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants were involved
in any of the misconduct asserted in his amended complaint.
Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them.
claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments when they diagnosed him with a
psychotic disorder and had him placed on anti-psychotic
drugs. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980),
the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal
conviction does not authorize the state to classify a
prisoner as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary
psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due
process protections. The Vitek Court noted that the
state had a strong interest in segregating and treating
mentally ill patients, but that a prisoner's interest in
not being arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and
subjected to involuntary treatment was also strong. The Court
concluded that the state must apply “appropriate
procedural safeguards against error.” Id. at
subsequent case, the Supreme Court addressed the involuntary
medication of a ...