United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division
MARTIN F. SMITH, II, Plaintiff,
SCOTT McKENNA & RON KALAQUIN, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE
V. PARKER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
matter comes before the Court on a pro se civil
rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff
Martin F. Smith, II is confined at the Lapeer County Jail in
Lapeer, Michigan. The Defendants are (1) Lapeer County
Sheriff Scott McKenna and (2) Ron Kalaquin, who appears to
have been the Lapeer County Sheriff in 2015. (ECF No. 1 at Pg
ID 1-2.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory, injunctive, and
monetary relief for alleged violations of his civil rights.
For the reasons that follow, the Court is denying relief and
summarily dismissing the complaint.
complaint and exhibits allege that, on June 18, 2015, a jury
found Plaintiff guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon,
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82, possession of a firearm
during the commission, or attempt to commit, a felony, Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.227b, killing or torturing an animal,
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.50b, and domestic violence, Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.812. On September 14, 2015, the trial
court sentenced Plaintiff to 180 days in the county jail for
the assault and torture convictions, ninety days in jail for
the domestic violence conviction and two years in a state
correctional facility for the felony-firearm conviction. On
September 18, 2015, county officials transferred Plaintiff
from the county jail to the Michigan Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”) for service of his
felony-firearm conviction. The Michigan Parole Board
eventually released Plaintiff on parole for the
felony-firearm conviction, and on June 16, 2017, Lapeer
County officials took custody of Plaintiff so he could serve
his remaining sentences in the county jail.
argues Defendants violated his constitutional rights when
they took custody of him following his confinement in state
prison. He contends Defendants did not read or acknowledge
the judgment of sentence, which lacks a check mark by item 8.
The lack of a check mark is an indication that the sentences
are to be served concurrently, not consecutively. (ECF No. 1
at Pg ID 7.)
sues Defendants in their personal and official capacities. He
seeks: a declaratory judgment stating Defendants refuse to
acknowledge the judgment of sentence and have violated his
constitutional rights; an injunction ordering Defendants to
release him without further delay; and money damages in the
amount of $6, 000 per day for wrongful incarceration.
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 requires federal
district courts to screen a prisoner's complaint and to
dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to
state a claim for which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1); Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d
249, 252 (6th Cir. 2010); Smith v. Campbell, 250
F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court is “required
to screen all civil cases brought by prisoners, regardless of
whether the inmate paid the full filing fee, is a pauper, is
pro se, or is represented by counsel, as the statute does not
differentiate between civil actions brought by
prisoners.” In re Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997).
prepaid the filing fee for this action, and courts may not
summarily dismiss a prisoner's fee-paid complaint under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), because that section applies to
complaints filed in forma pauperis. McVey v.
Polster, 20 F. App'x 479, 480 (6th Cir. 2001);
Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1015-16 (6th
Cir. 1999). Benson, however, does not prohibit
federal courts from screening a prisoner's fee-paid civil
rights complaint against government officials under
§1915A. Hyland v. Clinton, 3 F. App'x
478, 478-79 (6th Cir. 2001).
complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law
or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). “A complaint is subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true,
show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,
” the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on
the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are
true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations
omitted). In other words, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To
prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove
two elements: “(1) that he or she was deprived of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person
acting under color of law.” Robertson v.
Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014).
complaint is frivolous and fails to state a claim for which
relief may be granted because it challenges his confinement
in the county jail. The sole federal remedy for a state
prisoner's challenge to the very fact or duration of
physical imprisonment is a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 ...